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The booming computer software industry has been and
increasingly will be the source of controversy regarding issues of
proprietary rights. The reasons for this phenomenon are several.
While the software industry is new and rapidly expanding, older
legal doctrine is not easily applied to its difficult technology and
complex commercial relationships. Moreover, software development
is creative and the industry is characterized by high employee
mobility and relative ease of entry. At the same time, software
duplication is relatively cost-free, and the determination of whether
software was independently developed, or stolen, is often
exceedingly difficult to make.
The legal ground rules that will govern the industry's
development are very important to all of the participants.
Employers must be wary of hiring programmers who may use trade
secrets belonging to former employers. Employees must be wary of
seriously diminishing their marketability because of covenants
expressed in contracts or implied by law. Competitors must be
wary of others obtaining their confidential information through
former employees or access to documentation distributed on a
limited basis. And end users and distributors must be wary of
losing their source of supply, maintenance, and enhancements
should their licensor be the subject of an action for trade secret
misappropriation.
The trade secret laws offer one of the principal methods of
protecting computer software. Unfortunately, it is often extremely
difficult to determine what information is unique to a particular
competitor-and thus should be protected from other competitors or
use by an employee for his own benefit-and what information is
generic to a profession or business and should not be so protected.
Moreover, it is equally difficult in many cases to determine whether
information has been the subject of independent development or
has come into another's possession through misappropriation.
Finally, with the emergence of new channels of distribution such as
those designed to reach the mass market, the efficacy of trade secret
protection for some software is very much an unknown. This article
will address each of these subjects.
I. APPLICABILITY OF TRADE SECRET LAW TO SOFTWARE
A.

BASIC DEFINITION OF TRADE SECRET

Most states and all federal jurisdictions have approved all or
part of the definition of "trade secret" set forth in section 757, com-
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ment b, of the Restatement of Torts (the Restatement).' As defined
by the Restatement, a trade secret may consist of:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret ...

so that,

except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in
acquiring the information. An exact definition of a trade secret is
not possible. Some factors to be considered in determining whether
given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which
the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to
which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy
of the information; (4) the value of the information to him in developing the information; ... (6) the ease or difficulty with which the

information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
The Restatement definition requires the presence of three elements as a condition to the existence of a trade secret: novelty, secrecy, and value in the trade or business of the putative trade secret
owner.2 These materials will deal mainly with the elements of secrecy and novelty. The element of value can usually be satisfied by
use of the trade secret in a trade or business and these materials
will generally assume the presence of such "value."
B.

NOVELTY IN

GENERAL

Computer-related trade secret cases have generally required the
plaintiff to establish that the subject matter be, in some degree, orig3
inal or novel and not generally or commonly known in the trade.
Thus, "matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in [the]
industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret."4
Although there is authority for the literal proposition that "[a In
overwhelming majority of authorities on the subject have ruled that
novelty and uniqueness are not a requirement for trade secret protection,"'5 courts granting trade secret protection typically find that
the subject matter was "sufficiently novel."' 6 At a minimum, it is
clear that, in seeking trade secret protection, the plaintiff need not
1. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); see R. -MILGRIM,TRADE
SECRETS, 2.01 (1978) [hereinafter MILGRIM].
2. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b.
3. See generally MILGRIM, supra note 1, at
2.01-.09.
4. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, 311 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
5. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
6. See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 110
(Del. 1975).
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show that the subject matter possesses the same degree of novelty
7
as is required for patent protection.
C.

NOVELTY

WITH RESPECT TO SOFTWARE

The qualities of software which most often qualify for protection
as trade secrets are the elements comprising the software's unique
logic and coherence. Three indicia of this unique logic and coherence are: (1) novel combinations of generally known concepts;
(2) the dedication of time and expense to create features providing
some competitive advantage, and (3) substantive uniqueness in application. Generic knowledge (i.e., knowledge generally known in
the computer industry) is not subject to trade secret protection.
1.

Novel Combinations of Generally Known Concepts

In Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc.,8 plaintiff developed a time-sharing operating system, together with a high-level
programming language and text editor. After holding that this
software was based upon "new principles and concepts with unique
engineering, logic and coherence," the court dealt with defendant's
claim that the software was not secret or new, but in the public
domain:
[T]he existing software systems which are unique in the computer time sharing industry all contain certain elements which perform similar functions and many utilize certain similar fundamental
concepts, and in the most general sense, a common base. Such is
common in all engineering. Thus, the concept of vehicular locomotion, involving in one aspect, the basic principles of the internal
combustion engine, is common to snowmobiles, ships, airplanes,
and automobiles. But there the similarity stops. The varying systems, as patent lawyers so eloquently demonstrate, differ greatly in
the steps taken to accomplish the objective. Similarly here. The
specific engineering of these software systems, and their particular
underlying technologies and design, together with what has been
referred to as their 'logic and coherence', as well as their speed, accuracy, cost and commercial feasibility, may differ greatly from system to system. They will and do inevitably reflect the peculiar and
unique accomplishments and technical skills of the developers
thereof. This, in a nutshell, is what the software systems developed
by the plaintiff supplies to the defendant under the Technical Exchange Agreement. And while it is true that defendant may have
made certain technical changes in software supplied to it by plaintiff under the Technical Exchange Agreement, the defendant did
not alter the unique principles, engineering logic, and coherence de7. See Mn~xm, supra note 1, at 2.08.
8. 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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9
veloped by plaintiff into such software system.
The court in Corn-Share correctly articulated one reason why
most software will, assuming that its putative owner maintains the
requisite level of secrecy, constitute a trade secret. For example,
while the design of every inventory control or general ledger system
will require the programming of similar algorithms and result in the
production of functionally similar software, the multitude of specific
programming decisions required as part of the development process
will be made differently by different programmers and result in systems of different "speed, accuracy, cost and commercial feasibility."
Thus, different software systems running on the same machine and
processing the same data might exhibit different response times to
user requests, different interface capabilities with other systems or
different error detection techniques. Since the Restatement definition of a trade secret speaks in terms of "competitive advantage",
trade secret protection should not be denied to software simply because it is developed through the use of generally known skills or
the combination of generally known concepts. The "unique logic
and coherence" produced by different applications of such skills or
combinations of such concepts by individual programmers will produce a certain level of commercial feasibility which should constitute trade secret subject matter.10
With the exception of very simple programs involving few algorithms, none of which lends itself to multiple programming solutions, virtually all software will be the result of individual
programming decisions made through the application of generally
known programming skills or through the combination of generally
known data processing concepts which in the aggregate, or in combination with each other, may rise to the level of a trade secret.

2. Dedication of Time and Expense
Closely allied to the concept of "unique logic and coherence"
and "commercial feasibility" as a basis for granting most software
trade secret status is the fact that the development of a software
9. Id. at 1234.
10. See, e.g., Cybertek Computer Products, Inc. v. Whitefleld, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1020 (1977) (defendant, who developed competing system similar to that of former
employer, argued that former employer's Auto/Issue System could not constitute a
trade secret insofar as it consisted of well-known concepts in the computer industry;
the court held that, while general concepts are not protectable, the specific implementation of a particular combination of general concepts here constituted a protectable
trade secret); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), (in a hardware context, court held that features which in themselves were neither "new, novel,
secret nor innovative" could in combination constitute a trade secret since they allowed IBM to "achieve its goals of the 38309 in terms of cost and performance").
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system requires a great deal of time and effort. The employer who
expends such time and effort to achieve a certain result has a competitive advantage over the competitor who has not expended such
time and effort and therefore cannot achieve the same result. Such
a competitive advantage should, under the definition set forth in the
Restatement, be entitled to trade secret protection, despite the fact
that it results simply from the dedicated application of generally
known skills or combinations of generally known concepts. This
conclusion is particularly important in an industry such as software
development where technology moves at such a rapid pace that a
small head start in reaching the market is often the difference between the economic success and failure of a given product.
This principle has been implicitly recognized by the courts. In
fashioning injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secrets,
courts frequently have applied the "head start" doctrine which limits the length of injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade
secrets to the time it would have taken the defendant to independently develop the trade secret."
3. Substantive Uniqueness in Application
The great majority of software-related trade secret cases which
have been decided to date, and which are likely to be decided in the
years to come, focus on software which is functionally similar to
many competing systems that coexist in the marketplace and is
therefore properly characterized as having been developed through
the application of widely known skills or combination of generally
known concepts. Several cases, most of which involve issues of patent protection, however, have been decided involving software
which involves the application of data processing technology to
functions not previously or commonly automated. Such software is
obviously entitled to trade secret protection and, as discussed below, should perhaps be entitled to different treatment in the context
12
of trade secret disputes than that accorded other types of software.
11. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 142
(9th Cir. 1965); Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E. 804, 807 (Mass. 1976).
12. See, for example, In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (patentability of method of using computer to control a rubber curing process); In re Bernhardt, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(patentability of method of using computer to illustrate 3-Dimensional object);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (patentability of method for developing update parameters to detect the presence of abnormal conditions in catalytic conversion);
Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F.
Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (employer/employee trade secret dispute involving
software developed to utilize isoparametric elements in structural analysis).
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4. Generic Versus Specific in the Employment Context
While no item can be accorded trade secret protection unless it
possesses a certain element of novelty, the public policy against
post-employment restrictions often causes a trade secret plaintiff to
face more difficulty in establishing the requisite element of novelty
than if the misappropriation had taken place outside the context of
an employer/employee relationship. The reason for such additional
burden is the difficulty in determining whether or not items which
an employer seeks to bring within the umbrella of trade secret protection are in fact knowledge generically necessary to the practice
by an employee of his chosen business in a given industry or generally known to those familiar with such industry. To the extent that
knowledge is viewed as generically necessary or as generally known
information, it is not protectable as a trade secret. 13 A review of case
law on this issue permits generalization of some analytical distinctions which will now be examined.
a.

Knowledge Gained About ParticularVertical Markets

Although much similarity exists among software systems
designed to perform similar functions (e.g., inventory control or general ledger) in different types of business (e.g., home improvement
centers or supermarkets), knowledge of the specific needs of a given
type of business (commonly referred to as a "vertical market") is an
invaluable aid in designing a system for that business. It has been
held that the knowledge of a particular vertical market gained by an
employee in the design of a system for that vertical market is general information which such employee should be able to use in developing a competing system.
For example, in Automated Systems, Inc. v. Service Bureau
Corp.,14 plaintiff developed inventory control software for the automotive parts business in which data base updating was made
through punch cards kept in a "tub fie." Defendant, after contracting to act as the exclusive sales agent in marketing the plaintiffs inventory control system on a trial basis, terminated its
contract with plaintiff after the trial period expired and developed a
similar, competing system where input was made through tape from
an adding machine. The employee most responsible for developing
defendant's inventory control system, had, prior to beginning the
13. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 929 (5th Cir. 1975) (employee cannot be
restrained from using or disclosing to subsequent employers "information acquired

during the course of previous employment which was a matter of general knowledge"
or was "general technical or business information learned in former employment");
MmGRiM, supra note 1, at 5.02.
14. 401 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1968).
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trial period in the exclusive sales contract, wide experience in data
processing and systems analysis, but had gained all of his expertise
in the automotive parts business while working with plaintiff under
the exclusive sales contract. The court held that the knowledge
about the automotive parts business which the employee gained
from his dealings with plaintiff during the trial period was merely
"general information" about that type of business not entitled to
15
trade secret protection.
b.

Knowledge Which Employee Would Have Gained in
ComparableEmployment With a Different
Employer

Although the learning curve for the less skilled may be steeper
than that for the more experienced, every software programmer will
increase his skills and knowledge with each task that he completes.
This phenomenon is obviously not limited to the software industry
and, in fact, the promise of increased training (and corresponding
increase in marketability) in one's profession by exposure to unfamiliar areas is frequently a prime motivation for selecting one potential employer over another. The mere fact that an employer
provides training in a particular aspect of an industry is not sufficient to allow that employer to prevent his employees from utilizing
what they learn in the course of that training for their own or a subsequent employer's benefit if the employee would have learned such
information in the course of similar employment elsewhere.
Reduced to its fundamentals, this principle is a restatement of
the basic tenet of trade secret law requiring novelty as a condition
to legal protection. Where an employee could have gained comparable training elsewhere, the balancing of an employer's need for
trade secret protection against the public policy encouraging 16employee mobility strongly suggests a finding of non-infringement.
15. Id. at 609. See also Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287
(1974) (former employee had only learned general, not confidential, information
about certain aspects of banking business in the course of developing certain banking

software).
16. See Wilson Certified Food, Inc. v. Fairbury Food Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 108
in the
course of his employment with plaintiff and, upon a finding that such process was
widely known in the food industry, trade secret protection was denied); Berkshire
Apparel Corp. v. Stogel, 360 Mass. 863, 277 N.E.2d 310 (1971) (employer's general
knowledge and experience in its industry could not be claimed a trade secret so as to
(D. Neb. 1974) (plaintiffs employee developed process for creating bacon bits

prevent employee from continuing to work in same industry); Mnxuul,

at 5.02.

supra note 1,
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SECRECY WITH RESPECT TO SOFTWARE

The Restatement definition and numerous cases establish that
subject matter for
the existence of a trade secret depends upon the
17
which protection is sought remaining "secret."
1.

In-House Measure to Protect Secrecy
a.

Case Example

In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,18 evidence showed that IBM had its
employees sign an "Employee Confidential Information and Invention Agreement" at the commencement of their employment with
IBM and, at least as to the employees that were subsequently hired
by IBM's competitor, Telex, that IBM had reminded them prior to
their departure that they had had access to proprietary, confidential
and trade secret information and were contractually prohibited from
disclosing this information to others. In addition, IBM used magnetic locks on building doors to allow access only to authorized personnel, as well as document control procedures, guards, television
cameras, sensors, locks, safes and computer-controlled access systems; it even manufactured sensitive hardware components inhouse rather than having them contracted to outside vendors. The
trial court not only found that IBM had taken sufficient precautions
to protect its secrets, but assigned part of the cost of those measures
as damages attributable to Telex's unlawful attempt to penetrate the
secrets. 19 The Tenth Circuit, while agreeing that IBM's security
measures were sufficient, disallowed the damage award with respect
20
to the cost of such measures to IBM for lack of proximate cause.
17. See MuGRIM, supra note 1, at 1 2.03. The following discussion is intended to
provide a relatively comprehensive list of "secrecy" measures which, in an ideal
world, might be adopted by a company desiring to protect its information or a trade

secret. Many of these measures will simply be impractical for companies to adopt
given the day to day realities of their businesses. Fortunately for trade secret plaintiffs, only "relative" rather than "absolute" secrecy is required for maintenance of a
trade secret. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
18. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).

19. Id. at 330.
20. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Structural
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp.
1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("Although (the employer] did not use the ultimate in
policing measures, the professional caliber of its employees, and true nature of its development work [in software support for structural analysis programs) made heavyhanded measures unnecessary"); Digital Dev. Corp. v. International Memory Sys., 185
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (trade secret in disc memory; no express nondisclosure agreement necessary where employee actually knows that information is
trade secret; non-secret manufacturing conduct at the plant did not destroy trade secret elements of the product); Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (hardware and software; plaintiff used "utmost caution"
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b. Physical Control of Premises
Access to any sensitive areas should be restricted to approved
personnel. I.D. badges or sign-in/sign-out procedures may facilitate
the control of access. Devices to detect intruders may be advisable.
Sensitive areas should be locked securely and premises may be
divided and compartmentalized to control the flow of sensitive
materials. Limiting the number of doors and windows in sensitive
areas will decrease the threat of break-in. In addition, attention
should be directed to possible avenues of access to restricted areas
through stairways, roofs, mail slots, basements and adjoining buildings. Security guards may be needed.
Terminals or other peripheral devices through which important
materials may be accessed should be in secure locations accessible
only to authorized personnel. Keys, combinations or passwords
may be required to operate certain equipment or to access certain
files. Other more exotic procedures such as voiceprint identification
devices or devices that identify fingerprints or hand geometry may
also be considered. Keys to doors and terminals, combinations,
passwords and similar security devices should be changed regularly,
and also should be changed whenever an employee with access to
such a key or code leaves the organization, and whenever it becomes apparent that security has been compromised.
Access to any tape library should be restricted carefully. It
should be required that all tapes be signed in and signed out at all
times.
All trash, scratch pads, tapes, residual data, notes, and similar
materials should be disposed of in a manner that assures that no
useful information can be obtained from them. Trash containers
often are one of the most fruitful sources for those seeking access to
confidential information. If a shredder or similar device is
purchased, it should be able to accomodate all the different kinds of
materials that may need to be destroyed.
c. Establishing an Employee Trade Secret Program
All employees and other parties having access to any proprietary materials should be required to sign a confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement. Ideally such agreements should be executed
in protecting its trade secrets where each page of listings embodying plaintiffs sys-

tems contained the words "Corn-Share, Inc. Company Confidential"; where "passwords" were built into the system to prevent unauthorized access; and where tapes

were kept locked when not in use); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
910 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (magnetic memory cores; trade secrecy preserved where employees had signed non-disclosure agreement).
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at the outset of employment. If such a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement is executed after commencement of employment,
any restrictive covenants may not be binding unless there is "new"
consideration. Continuation of employment at will generally is not
sufficient consideration to justify enforcement of a restrictive covenant.21 If supported by the actual facts, it may therefore be advisable to provide in such agreement with already existing employees
that the agreement simply confirms already existing policies known
to the employees at the time of first employment. Some "new" consideration might be introduced, e.g., a change in benefits or profit
sharing, or a firm commitment to retain the employee for some fixed
period of time.
Whenever personnel leave their employment, a session should
be held during which the employee is reminded of his or her obligations to maintain the organization's trade secrets. A termination
agreement should also be executed by the employee acknowledging
such restrictions. The refusal of an employee to sign such an agreement could give rise to an inference that the employee intended to
not have been
misappropriate secrets (otherwise he or she would
22
obligations).
secrecy
the
acknowledge
reluctant to
All personnel should be instructed as to the importance of security and the steps being taken to preserve secrecy. Procedures
should be established and personnel should be instructed on how to
proceed in the event of certain breaches of security, e.g., how to respond to the presence of unauthorized personnel in a secure area.
Procedures also should be established for securing the building at
night and prior to any evacuation of the building due to fires or
bomb threats. Fires may be started or bomb threats instigated by
personnel within the organization, and the confusion of evacuation
may present an ideal opportunity for normal security procedures to
be ignored and for materials to disappear.
Notice should be displayed prominently on walls and bulletin
boards reminding employees of the confidential nature of their work
and the importance of preserving secrecy.
Consideration should be given to designating certain specific
materials as "SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL" or "FOR INTERNAL
USE ONLY" or similar designation. Such notices may, however,
serve to pinpoint precisely which materials are most sensitive and
thus direct a thief to the most valuable documents. Particular individuals within the organization should be assigned responsibility for
the security program. If any procedures or policies are breached by
21. See Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1944).
22. An overreaching exit form will, however, provide the employee with an obvious justification for refusing to sign.
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any employees, disciplinary measures should be taken to convey to
all employees that such behavior will not be tolerated. Senior management should adhere to the same policies and procedures as other
employees in order to emphasize the significance of protecting trade
secrets and the organization's commitment to that goal.
Any employee who is terminated or who may be disgruntled
should be immediately excluded from access to sensitive areas and
materials, and all other employees should be immediately notified of
such action. Personnel should be instructed not to leave sensitive
materials lying in plain sight on desks and work tables. Access to
copying machines should be restricted, particularly outside of normal working hours.
Various safeguards can be built into a computer system containing sensitive information. Access to certain files can be restricted to
those who have a "need to know." Audit trails, transaction logs, and
similar measures can be implemented to deter unauthorized access
and to help pinpoint possible breaches of security after they have
occurred.

Communication lines should be protected against wiretaps.
Cryptographic devices may be used to scramble signals, and one can
make it physically difficult to tap the lines. Wiretapping is, contrary
to common belief, most likely to occur on the same premises as the
hardware. Limiting access to the few places in the building where
communications circuits are sufficiently well labeled for someone to
know which line to tap (e.g. a communications circuit box) will eliminate the easiest way to tap the lines.
Periodic reviews of the secrecy program with input from all segments of the organization is essential. Additionally, speeches and
outlines prepared by employees should be reviewed from time to
time to be certain trade secrets are not being revealed.
2. Preserving Secrecy in Distributionof Software
a. General
Internal measures aimed at protecting the secrecy of a claimed
trade secret must, if the trade secret is to be maintained, be coupled
with efforts to protect secrecy in the course of distribution to customers. These efforts generally take the form of restrictions imposed on customers with respect to the use, duplication and
disclosure of the trade secret. It is critical to bear in mind that once
a trade secret is placed in the public domain either by reason of inadequate internal controls or by reason of unrestricted dissemination to the public in the course of marketing, the trade secret is lost
for all purposes.
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b.

Use of License Rather than Sale Agreements

It is generally thought that the license rather than the sale of
software is more consistent with the retention of trade secret rights
in such software. It is conceptually meaningful to retain proprietary
rights in and title to a licensed product, while it is conceptually inconsistent with a sale to retain such right and title in a product
which is sold. 23 Moreover, under both antitrust principles and in
light of policies against restraints on alienation, the necessary restrictions on use or disclosure of a licensed product are more likely
to be enforceable than with respect to a product that is sold.
c.

Typical Restraints Imposed on Customers Receiving
Copies of Software

The following restraints are commonly found in software license
agreements relating to the use and disclosure of the software:
(i) Prohibition on copying other than for archival or back-up
purposes;
(ii) No disclosure except to the customer's employees in the
course of their employment as necessary to utilize the software;
(iii) Requirement that employees of the customer receiving access to the software sign confidentiality agreements directly enforceable by licensor;
(iv) Limitation of use to single central processing unit

("CPU");
(v) Restriction on processing of third party data;
(vi) Requirement that the customer notify licensor of unauthorized use or disclosure, and requirement that the customer take
legal action against third party who gains access to software and is
using it on an unauthorized basis as a result of the customer having
failed to comply with the contractual restriction; and
(vii) Requirement that distributors of software obtain license
agreements from their customers containing nondisclosure
restriction.
d.

PracticalMethods for Preserving Trade Secrecy and
Detecting Misappropriationof Computer Software

A number of practical methods have been developed which may
support an argument that the trade secrets contained in software
can be kept out of the public domain despite a vigorous marketing
23. Cf. Section II infra for a discussion of the feasibility of retaining trade secret
protection in a sold item in circumstances where the trade secrets embodied in such
item are not readily ascertainable upon inspection.
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effort. These methods are generally used in conjunction with license restrictions, although Section II below will examine whether
such methods might, standing alone, be sufficient to protect the secrecy of the trade secrets in software. Because of the difficulty in
proving trade secret misappropriation (see discussion in Section IV
below), these methods are particularly significant since they may, as
a practical rather than legal matter, hinder the misappropriation of
the trade secrets. The following methods may also be used to assist
in the detection of misappropriation.
(i) Programs or data files can be stored only in encrypted or
enciphered form, thus rendering them unintelligible unless
deciphered.
(ii) Firmware such as read-only memory ("ROMs") may be
mounted in a cassette or on a circuit board and covered with an
opaque resin or epoxy which is difficult to remove without damaging
the firmware.
(iii) A program may be distributed in more than one medium,
all of which are essential for the program to execute. For example,
the majority of a program may be on a floppy disk, with small but
critical portions (e.g., a cipher key) contained on a ROM which
either is an integral part of the hardware or must be connected to a
circuit board by the end-user.
(iv) Hardware may be designed so that many programs are integrated into the hardware configuration on firmware, but can only
be activated by authorized service personnel.
(v) Hardware and software can be designed to be incompatible
unless a particular copy of the software is run on a particular
machine. This may be a useful technique to use for operating systems software, though it may raise antitrust issues.
(vi) Various elements can be embedded in a program to facilitate proof that copying has occurred, e.g. duplicative runaway logic,
or other proprietary rights
dead code, unexecutable code, copyright
24
notices, or other identifying materials.
(vii) A program can be designed with certain "time-fuses" so
that it will not execute unless periodically updated or serviced by
authorized personnel. Creative programmers can also build safeguards into a program which causes it to ignore an instruction to
24. See Williams Elec. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., Civil Action No. 81-1852 (D.N.J. 1981)
(program allegedly duplicated by defendant from plaintiffs program for an electronic
coin-operated game contained an identical error, sets of initials and high scores of
several of plaintiffs employees involved in the original testing of the program including plaintiffs president, and copyright notices in plaintiff's name which were stored
within the program so that the notice would not normally be displayed on the CRT
while utilizing the program).
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"dump" or print-out its entire contents, to erase critical portions of
itself, to shut down the main CPU, to leave clear signals that a
breach of security has occurred, and other similar protective
mechanisms.
(viii) Serial numbers or similar unique identifying elements
can be embedded in programs to aid in pinpointing the source of
any unauthorized duplication.
(ix) The program may be distributed only in machine-readable
object code, as distinguished from human understandable source
code. With the increasing availability and sophistication of "decompliers" and "disassemblers" which can (to varying degrees) reverse
object code into source code, the efficacy of object code dissemination exclusively as a method of protecting the trade secrets contained in a particular software program is somewhat diminished.
See Section II below for a discussion of the impact of decompilation
and disassembly on the ability to protect software in the mass
market.
(x) Blank tracks can be included on floppy discs containing
software.
(xi) Nonstandard markets, trailers and checksums can be used
to delimit address and data fields.
(xii) Data can be recorded midway between normal track
positions.
II.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PROTECTING THE TRADE
SECRET NATURE OF SOFTWARE IN THE MASS
MARKET
A.

THE ISSUES

With the advent of relatively low cost microprocessor-based
hardware and the massive increase in the number of such computers now being sold, the software industry has become increasingly focused on the production of mass-distributed software for use
on the "personal" or "small business" machine. This software is
(i) generally written in a very high level language, (ii) distributed at
a very low per copy cost, (iii) often marketed by mail order or
through retail stores and (iv) if successful, distributed to thousands
of users.
A number of significant trade secret issues are raised by the
mass-distribution of microprocessor software:
1. Is it practical for software developers to obtain signed nondisclosure agreements from thousands of users, many of whom will
be using such software in their homes and may be intimidated by a
formal license agreement? This issue becomes particularly signifi-
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cant in a mail order context when customers simply send in a check
for $100 and expect to receive a copy of the software by return mail.
2. Even if license agreements are obtained from customers,
will the circumstances under which such agreements are generally
obtained affect the enforceability of such agreements in the courts?
3. Even if enforceable license agreements are obtained from all
customers, does the fact that many thousands of copies of the
software are distributed nonetheless mean that the software cannot
reasonably be viewed as "secret"? Such a conclusion might result in
the loss of trade secret protection for such mass-distributed
software.
4. Given the practical difficulties of obtaining license agreements from customers acquiring mass-distributed software, it is
likely that some percentage of such customers will not be party to a
formal license agreement. Does such a percentage failure cause the
developer to lose trade secret protection?
5. Does the existence of practical protections for mass-distributed software as described in Section I above provide the developer
of mass-distributed software with a means of retaining trade secret
protection for such software despite wide distribution and imperfect
or nonexistent licensing practices?

B.

OBTAINING THE LICENSE AGREEMENT

In recognition of the tremendous administrative and practical
difficulties of obtaining executed license agreements from customers
of mass-distributed software, developers have increasingly been
abandoning such an approach. Instead, licensors are simply providing the software in a sealed diskette and are, concurrent with the
delivery, providing the customer with a set of Standard License
Terms and Conditions. These terms and conditions, as well as a legend placed on the diskette, specify that the customer will be
deemed to have accepted the Standard License Terms and Conditions by the act of breaking the seal on the diskette or actually using
the software. In a mail order context, licensors are providing that if
the customer does not want to accept the terms and conditions of
license, he can simply return the unopened diskette to the licensor
and receive a full refund of monies paid.
Another approach taken by licensors is to condition a warranty
or right to receive updates or notice of updates upon return of a
signed warranty card which also includes an acknowledgment and
acceptance of the terms and conditions of license.
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C.

ENFORCEABILITY OF LICENSE AGREEMENTS FOR MASS

DISTRIBUTED SOFTWARE

It is likely that license agreements with end-users obtained in a
manner similar to that described above will be subject to attack using familiar consumer-oriented arguments such as adhesion and unconscionability. Licensors should be able to argue that software
users are sufficiently sophisticated to understand the nature of and
need for a simple commitment of non-duplication. Obviously, this
argument will be the liveliest with respect to the true home users of
personal computers. It is interesting to speculate on the impact that
a court opinion voiding such an agreement with respect to a particular software product would have on trade secret protection claimed
by licensors of other mass distributed software. If courts begin to
view such agreements as unenforceable, can a licensor of mass-distributed software reasonably rely on such agreements as a basis for
maintaining the "secret" nature of their software?

D.

IMPACT OF MASS DISTRIBUTION ON SECRECY

Even if enforceable license agreements are obtained from all
end-users of mass-distributed software, an issue still exists as to
whether or not the mere fact of massive distribution is inconsistent

with the "secrecy" element of trade secret protection.
1.

Case Law

It is clear that disclosure of trade secrets in the course of a confidential relationship (either implied by law or created by contract)
does not cause the trade secret to cease being "secret" for purposes
of trade secret law. Although the issue has not been specifically decided for mass-distributed software, relevant case authority suggests that the number of copies distributed in confidence should not,
as a matter of law, result in the loss of trade secret protection for
the information embodied in such copies.
a.

25
Board of Trade v. Christie

The Chicago Board of Trade sought to prevent the use and distribution, by the defendants, of the continuous quotations of prices
on sales of grain futures which the Board collected and confidentially communicated to a great number of its own customers. In affirming the judgment for the Board, the Supreme Court stated:
In the first place, apart from special objections, the plaintiffs
collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It
25. 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
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stands like a trade secret. The plaintiff has the right to keep the
work which it has done, or paid for doing, to itself. The fact that
others might do similar work, if they might, does not authorize
them to steal the plaintiff's.26 The plaintiff does not lose its rights
by communicating the results to persons, even if many, in confidential relations to itself under a contract not to make it public, and
strangers to the trust will be restrained from getting at the knowledge by inducing a breach of trust, and using knowledge obtained
27
by such a breach.
b.

28
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co.

In this case, plaintiff distributed railroad car designs to purchasers for limited purposes which the court found were understood by
such purchasers despite the absence of express contractual restrictions. Despite evidence indicating that distribution of the design
drawings was "so great that an investigation at trial of the circumstances of each was a practical impossibility," the court held that
such broad disclosure could not defeat a claim for trade secret protection in the design drawings when such disclosure was made on a
29
restricted basis.
c.

Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc. 30

In this case, plaintiff Data General sought trade secret protection for maintenance diagrams which, according to defendant's
claims, were accessible by almost 6,000 people by the time of trial.
The court found that Data General had taken adequate measures to
protect the confidentiality of the diagrams, stating that "dissemina' 31
tion is not significant if in confidence.
2.

Relative Versus Absolute Secrecy

The ability to maintain trade secret protection for mass-distributed software may ultimately turn on application of the well-established principle that relative or qualified, as opposed to absolute,
32
secrecy is all that is required by trade secret law.
For example, in K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co. ,33 the Ninth Circuit
held that:
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
1972).
33.

Cf Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithgraphing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Id. at*250-51 (emphasis added).
210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904).
Id. at 468, 60 A. at 8.
357 A.2d 105 (Del. Ch. 1975).
Id. at 114.
Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 436, 438 (Del.
506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974).
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There are two common law doctrines on secrecy: (1) absolute
secrecy and (2) relative secrecy. The better view ... is the majority view of relative secrecy which has been adopted by the Restatement of Torts § 757 . . . and that reasonable measures under the
circumstances be taken to protect the secret .... The necessary
determination of '[w]hether such a degree of secrecy existed in a
particular case is a question of fact[;]'. . . and the trier of fact must
consider 'the entirety of circumstances surrounding use' of the secret .... 34
As the court in K-2 Ski recognizes, the question of secrecy is
one of fact to be analyzed in view of all of the surrounding circumstances. It is likely that courts will find the mass distribution of
software to thousands of users (even if accompanied by confidentiality legends or license agreements) relevant to such a factual inquiry. Courts should not, however, hold that such mass-distribution
35
will, as a matter of law, defeat a claim for trade secret protection.
Presumably, the potential non-enforceability of license agreements with consumers, as well as a licensor's expectation that not
all licensees will sign or agree to such license agreements prior to
receipt of the software, will also be thrown into the mix of facts relevant to the determination of "qualified secrecy."
Finally, the mere affixation of a copyright notice on software
should not, as a matter of law, defeat a claim for trade secret protection, although such affixation may be factually relevant to a determination of whether or not sufficient security measures have been
36
adopted.
3. Relative Secrecy and PracticalProtectionsfor Mass
Distributed Software
Since it can be assumed that all or some copies of most massmarketed software will, either intentionally or otherwise, be distributed to end-users without the protection of license agreements, the
issue arises as to whether or not such unprotected disclosure will
cause the developer to lose trade secret protection for the software.
a.

General Principles

Courts have unanimously approved of the proposition that un34. Id. at 473-74.
35. See Management Science Am., Inc. v. Cyborg Sys., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
36. See Warrington Assoc., Inc. v. Real Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367
(N.D. Ill. 1981); MILGRIM, supra note 1, at 2.06A(2) (6).
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37
protected disclosures of secrets forfeit trade secret protection.
When a product is marketed on an unrestricted basis, and the product has a "secret" associated with it, the secret will be lost if it can
38
be discerned upon scrutiny and inspection.

It is also well established that trade secret protection may be
lost through the type of disclosure occurring in advertising, circulars
39
passed around in the trade, or in other analogous manners.
In Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle,4° the court held that the publication of a photograph of allegedly secret heat treating equipment in
the annual report of the company constituted unprotected disclosure, even though the report was not itself addressed to a technical
audience. The court, noting that scrutiny by experts divulged substantial aspects of the alleged secret, indicated that the company's
cavalier publication of such photographs demonstrated a lack of "secretive intent" on the part of the company. The court held in that
circumstance the trade secret protection was lost.
Courts have even held that disclosures in technical publications
of very general aspects of a trade secret will result in the loss of
trade secret protection if the disclosure enables one skilled in the
41
art to discern the subject matter.
Some courts have also found that use or release of information
within the scope of claimed trade secrets, by individuals other than
the party claiming ownership of a trade secret, can undermine the
secrecy status of the trade secret, thereby undermining any claims
42
which such a party might have.
37. See Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1974).
38. See Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198
(1962); National Welding Equip. Co. v. Hammond Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788, 795
(N.D. Cal. 1958); Speedry Chem. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 334 (2d
Cir. 1962).
39. See Republic Sys. & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F.
Supp. 619, 628 (D. Conn. 1970) (plaintiff's advertising brochures listing the names of
customers for computer programming services was held to preclude a claim of trade
secret); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa.),
affd per curiam, 435 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1970) (operating instructions provided to customers held to disclose the trade secret); Hahn & Clay v. A.O. Smith Corp., 320 F.2d
166 (5th Cir. 1963) (held that disclosure occurred through advertising brochures and
technical papers delivered to trade and professional groups).
40. 438 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1971).
41. See Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. Rappl & Hoenig Co., 453 F.2d 250, 254-55
(2d Cir. 1972).
42. See Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376
(D.S.C. 1972).
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b. Retention of Trade Secret ProtectionDespite Disclosure
Without Restriction on Use: The Issue of Reverse
Engineering

The foregoing principles relating to loss of trade secrecy upon
unprotected disclosure do not specifically address what is perhaps
Do trade
the most critical issue in mass-distributed software:
secrets embodied in mass-distributed software marketed without restrictions on further disclosure retain their trade secret status if
they cannot be readily ascertained from the copies of the software
actually distributed? An analysis of this issue requires an understanding of the status of reverse engineering under trade secret
doctrine.
Reverse engineering is the process by which a product is examined and analyzed in order to reveal the process by which it was
created. 43 Trade secret law does not prevent someone who obtains a
product on the open market or through other permissible means
from using reverse engineering to discover the "secret" of a product
and thereafter to use such "secret."'44 Of course it is possible that
such reverse engineering may still infringe upon a patent or copyright or may result in a violation of trademark protection.
While it is clear that someone who actually does reverse engineer a product is free to do so, a more difficult question is whether
the fact that a product can be reverse engineered deprives the owner of the "secrets" contained therein of trade secret protection as
against a potential defendant who obtains the "secrets" by other
means, such as through a confidential relationship or through outright theft. Although there is language in many cases which implies
that there is no trade secret protection in such an instance because
there is no "secret," the facts of such cases generally reveal that
(i) defendant actually did "reverse engineer the product" or (ii) the
so-called secret was so readily ascertainable from an inspection of
the product that very little time or effort would be necessary in or45
der to duplicate the product or secret.
The issue of trade secret protection for ideas embodied in products distributed widely without restriction on use or disclosure
would thus seem to turn on how difficult it is to "reverse engineer"
the product. This concept is supported by comment B to the Restatement definition of a trade secret where it is indicated that one
43. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
44. Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804, 807 (Mass. 1976) ("a
device which has been described in trade journals and placed on the market is generally open to duplication by skilled engineers"); see generally MILRiM, supra note 1,
at 2.05[2] and cases cited therein.
45. See generally cases cited in MmGRum, supra note 1, at 2.05[21 & n.8.
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of the factors in determining whether a trade secret exists is "the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others." This concept is consistent with
the idea that a trade secret is in fact something which gives its owner a "competitive advantage" over others. Accordingly, if it will take
competitors an extensive period of time and require the expenditure
of significant funds to duplicate the "secrets" in a product on the
open market, manufacturers of such a product should be viewed as
having a trade secret to the extent of this time and cost advantage.
There is in fact extensive case authority to the effect that this is a
47
correct statement of the law.
A more recent case reflecting this principle of trade secret law is
Colony Corp. of America v. Crown Glass,4 8 in which the court
stated:
Where a product is out on the market, and the secret is readily
disclosed by the product itself there is no trade secret .... If the
secret is not easily ascertainable from the product itself, however,
the sale of the products may be enjoined in order to protect the secret despite the fact that the products are not themselves trade
secrets but are only the fruits of the use of a trade secret .... The

injunction in such a case is limited in scope to the time interval required for another to copy legally the secret from the goods on the
market ....

c.

49

Effect of Possibility of Reverse Engineeringon Scope of
Relief

Even if reverse engineering of a product or process is sufficiently difficult to justify a conclusion that the manufacturer of a
product marketed on an unrestricted basis has a valuable advantage
46. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757, supra note 1, at comment b.
47. See, e.g., Thermotics, Inc. v. Bat-Jac Tool Co., 541 S.W.2d 255, 260-61 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976) (where the court contrasted ideas which were "readily ascertainable" by
inspecting and reverse engineering and therefore not protectible as trade secrets,
with more complex ideas not readily discernable which were held protectible despite
the fact that they may have been technically disclosed or ascertainable); cf. A.F.
Holden Co. v. O'Brien, 73 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (no trade secret if
formula is readily ascertained through analysis by others in the trade). See also
Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1972) (appropriation of plaintiff's business plans and methods actionable despite the fact that such plans and methods
could have been independently ascertained due to difficulty and cost of doing so).
See generally Muxmam, supra note 1, at
2.03 and cases cited in n.12; see also
Maruchinics, IndustrialTrade Secrets: Their Use and Protection, CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
69-71, 72 (1975).
48. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Jan. 21, 1982, at A-13 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 16, 1981).
49. Id. at A-14.

19821

TRADE SECRET PROTECTION

over its competitors, the possibility of reverse engineering may nevertheless lead to a limitation on the extent of the protection which
will be available to such manufacturers under trade secret
principles.50
The fact that a product can be reverse engineered suggests that
injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secrets contained in
such product should be limited to the length of time it would take
for someone independently to develop or reverse engineer the secret by permissible methods. This principle is sometimes referred
to as giving a trade secret owner the appropriate competitive "head
start" to which he is entitled. 5 1 The application of the head start
principle to the granting of injunctive relief results in a general conclusion that an injunction should not extend beyond the period of
time that would be required to reverse engineer a product once it is
52
on the open market.
A particularly well-reasoned decision which explains the basis
of the "head start" approach and indicates that the length of time
required for reverse engineering is merely the starting place for determining the appropriate length of an injunction is Analogic Corp.
v. Data Translation,Inc.53 There, the court stated:
Our holding today is not to be interpreted to require that the
duration of an injunction be flexibly determined by the amount of
time necessary to reverse engineer the plaintiffs device without improper use of trade secrets. But evidence as to this time period is
one factor which should be considered in determining the reasonableness of the scope of such an injunction. Of course, defendants
who have wilfully attempted to profit through violation of a confidential relationship need not be placed in as good position as other,
honest competitors. '[T]he tendency of the law, both legislative
and common, has been in the direction of enforcing increasingly
higher standards of fairness or commercial morality in trade. The
tendency still persists.' The plaintiff is entitled to have its trade
secrets protected at least until others in the trade are likely,
through legitimate business procedures, to have become aware of
those secrets. And even then, the defendant should not be permit50. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392 (4th Cir. 1971) (duration of injunction held to be reasonable in light of evidence pertaining to the length of
time required for independent development).
51. MILGRIM, supra note 1, at 2.01.
52. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Dye Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 429 (1980)
(duration of injunction set at sixteen months to coincide with finding that this would
be length of time for independent development); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer
Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433 (Del. Ch. 1971), affd, 297 A.2d 437 (Del. 1972) (if injunction
were granted, duration would be time required for reverse engineering); see generally
MIGRIM, supra note 1, at 7.08[ 11 and cases cited in footnote 12.
53. 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976) (reversing granting of permanent injunction).
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ted a competitive advantage from their avoidance of the normal
costs of invention and duplication. Where the defendants have
saved substantial expense by improperly using confidential information in creating their product, the ultimate cessation of an injunctive order might well be conditioned on their payment of an
appropriate sum to the plaintiff. We mention this possibility to remind the lower courts of their creative equitable powers, and in
no
54
way intend to limit the scope of judicial discretion on remand.
An important consideration is the question of who has the burden of establishing an appropriate length of time for an injunction.
Clearly, the plaintiff must first establish that the product in question
is sufficiently difficult to reverse engineer that it is entitled to trade
secret protection. On the scope of injunctive relief, several courts
appear to have held that it is the defendant's burden to show that it
55
could, in fact, reverse engineer the product.
One factor which may justify an injunction extending beyond
the period required for reverse engineering, is the egregiousness of
56
the defendant's activities.
There is also case support for the proposition that the period for
which damages are assessible also terminates after the expiration of
57
the head start advantage gained by the misappropriator.
d.

Application of Reverse EngineeringPrinciples to Mass
Distributed Software

Based on the principles of reverse engineering and trade secret
accessibility set forth above, it is possible to construct an argument
that mass-marketed software distributed without enforceable confidentiality agreements or in extremely large quantities should nonetheless be entitled to trade secret protection. This argument would
be focused on the difficulty of obtaining the trade secrets embodied
54. Id. at 808 (citation omitted).

55. Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540, 553 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1970). Accord, Data
Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Control, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 114 (Del. Ch. 1975) (granting a permanent injunction where defendant was unable to carry its burden); Head
Ski Co. v. KAM Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 924 (D. Md. 1958); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209
F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
56. See, e.g., Rego Displays, Inc. v. Fournier, 379 A.2d 1098, 1102-03 (R.I. 1977); Lincoln Steel Products, Inc. v. Shuster, 49 A.D.2d 618, 371 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1975); Analogic
Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976).
57. See Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80 (1974); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (royalty damages imposed for period of time that would be required
for independent development); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 320-26, 359,
363 (N.D. Okla. 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1974) (reversing antitrust aspects, affirming trade secret aspects, but modifying computation of damages).
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in the object code of such software. The success of such an argument would depend on the following types of considerations:
(i) Was object code only distributed;
(ii) If object code only was distributed, how difficult would it
be to "decompile" or "disassemble" such object code and how successful would such a process of "reverse engineering" be in laying
bare the underlying trade secrets; and
(iii) What practical measures were taken to prevent copying
58
and "decompilation" or "disassembly" of the object code.
III.

APPLICATION OF TRADE SECRET PRINCIPLES IN
EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE CONTEXT

The courts have fashioned special rules regarding trade secrets
in the employment context, which, for the most part, limit the employer's rights against the employee.5 9
A.

THE PUBLIC POLICY PROTECTING EMPLOYEE MOBILITY

In order to prevail in an action for misappropriation of trade
secrets, the plaintiff must not only show the existence of a trade secret, but also that the defendant gained access to that trade secret
pursuant to, or in the course of, a covenant or confidential relationship imposing prohibitions on the defendant's subsequent use of
that trade secret. 60 As will be more fully discussed, the principal basis on which such prohibitions arise in the context of employer/employee relationships is through a covenant of nondisclosure implied by law into the employment relationship or
through the execution of an express covenant setting forth such
prohibitions. Any such implied or express covenant will, however,
be circumscribed in virtually all jurisdictions by judicially and legislatively adopted public policies solicitous of employee mobility.
These policies have been described by one court as follows:
The burden the appellees must thus meet brings to the fore a
problem of accommodating policies in our law: The right of an individual to the unhampered pursuit of the occupations and livelihoods for which he is best suited. There are cogent socio-economic
arguments in favor of either position. Society as a whole greatly
benefits from technological improvements. Without some means of
post-employment protection to assure that valuable developments
or improvements are exclusively those of the employer, the businessman could not afford to subsidize research or improve current
58. See supra Section I.
59. See also supra Section I.C.
60. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); Futurecraft Corp. v.
Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962).
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methods. In addition, it must be recognized that modern economic
growth and development had pushed the business venture beyond
the size of the one-man firm, forcing the businessman to a much
greater degree to entrust confidential business information relating
to technological development to appropriate employees. While recognizing the utility in the dispersion of responsibilities in larger
firms, the optimum amount of 'entrusting' will not occur unless the
risk of loss to the businessman through a breach of trust can be
held to a minimum.
On the other hand, any form of post-employment restraint
reduces the economic mobility of employees and limits their personal freedom to pursue a preferred course of livelihood. The employee's bargaining position is weakened because he is potentially
shackled by the acquisition of alleged trade secrets; and thus paradoxically, he is restrained, because of his increased expertise, from
advancing further in the industry in which he is most productive.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, society suffers because competition is diminished by
slackening the dissemination of ideas,
61
processes and methods.
In California, the courts have created a special rule which must
be applied when one of the defendants to a trade secret action is a
former employee of plaintiff:
One who seeks protection against the use or disclosure of a
trade secret must plead facts showing (1) the existence of subject
matter which is capable of protection as a trade secret; (2) the secret was disclosed to the defendant, under circumstances giving
rise to a contractual or other legally imposed obligation on the part
of the disclosuee not to use or disclose the secret to the detriment
of the discloser, and (3) if the defendant is an employee or former
employee of the plaintiff... the facts alleged must show that the
public policy in favor of the protection of the complainant'sinterest
in maintaining the secret outweighs the interest of the employee in
using his knowledge to support himself in other employment .... 62
61. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430, 434 (1960).
62. Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25 (1968)
(emphasis added). See also Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L.
REV. 583, 599 (1961) ("Protection should be afforded when, and only when, the information in question has value in the sense that it affords the plaintiff a competitive
advantage over competitors who do not know of it, and where the granting of such
protection will not unduly hamstring the ex-employee in the practice of his occupation or profession. This simple balancing process will invariably protect all of the
pertinent interests-those of the former employer, of the former employee, and of the
public."); Wear, A Balanced Approach to Employer-Employee Trade Secret Disputes
in California, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 671 (1980); MILGRIM, supra note 1, at 5.02.
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B.

DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF AN EMPLOYEE'S DuTY NOT TO

DISCLOSE OR USE TRADE SECRETS OF A FORMER EMPLOYER

The courts have also fashioned special substantive and procedural rules which refine the scope of an employee's duty of non-disclosure with respect to a former employer's trade secrets.
1. Implied Covenant of Non-Disclosure in Employer/Employee
Relationship
An employer seeking to establish trade secret misappropriation
by a former employee in developing a competing product either for
his own use or for use by a subsequent employer must show that
development of the product was accomplished through the improper
use of trade secret information rather than through independent development utilizing general information. The mere disclosure of
trade secret information by the owner of such information to a third
party does not, however, impose a restriction on such third party not
to use or disclose such information. As discussed above, the general
rule is that the trade secret status of information is lost if it is disclosed without some form of restriction on use or disclosure.
Despite the general rule that trade secret status is lost if the secret is disclosed, no such loss occurs where the disclosure follows
from or is made in the context of an employer/employee relationship since there is, in every employment relationship, an implied
covenant preventing employees from utilizing for their benefit or the
benefit of others any trade secrets to which they received access in
the course of their employment. 63 The existence of such a covenant
prevents an employer from losing trade secret protection for information disclosed to an employee in the course of his employment
and provides a legal basis on which to bring an action for trade secret misappropriation in the event that an employee uses such information for his own or a subsequent employer's benefit.
a.

Limitations on Implied Covenant of Non-Disclosure

Both in view of the public policy against limitations restricting
employee mobility and the inherently ambigous nature of implied
covenants, the courts have developed various rules limiting the
scope of such a covenant. These limitations are significant not only
in cases where an employer seeks to base a claim on the implied
63. See By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d
147 (1958) (former employee of plaintiff and his new employer held liable for misappropriation of plaintiffs trade secret despite absence of express non-disclosure covenant, since such a covenant is implied by law). See generally, MILGRIMv, Supra note 1,

at

5.02[1].
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covenant of non-disclosure, but also as a background for understanding the additional protection which may be available to an employer through use of written covenants.
(1)

Difficulty of Establishingthe Existence of Trade
Secret

The most significant limitation on the implied covenant of nondisclosure in employment relationships is the problem, discussed in
detail below, of showing that alleged trade secret information is in
fact a trade secret as opposed to general information relating to the
type of job the employee performs. As will be discussed below, express covenants of non-disclosure and covenants not to compete can
to a certain degree moot this issue.
(2)

Notice of ConfidentialNature of Information

While the implied covenant of non-disclosure in the employment relationship will operate to prevent use by a former employee
of trade secret information, it does not specifically describe what information the employer considers to be trade secret in nature. It is
unlikely that an employee ignorant of the trade secret nature of the
information to which he receives access in the course of his employment will be found liable for wrongful post-employment use of such
information. In the absence of an express covenant specifying the
trade secret nature of specific information, an employer will, in establishing a case for trade secret misappropriation based upon an
implied covenant of non-disclosure, have to establish notice by relying upon (i) the context in which such information is disclosed to
the employee, (ii) the measures taken by the employer to protect
the secret status of the information, or (iii) knowledge which the
employee can, based upon industry standards, reasonably be expected to possess as to what provides one employer with a competitive advantage over his competitors.6
Given the generally high level of concern exhibited by most employers over their software (e.g., restrictive licensing agreements;
non-dissemination of source code; confidentiality legends on humanreadable versions of the software; and in-house security measures),
it should not be too difficult for employers, in most circumstances
and even in the absence of express covenants, to establish the fact
that an employee receiving access to or developing software in the
5.0212], citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
64. See MiLGPIM, supra note 1, at
Guardian Glass Co., 322 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.
1972).
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course of his employment should have understood and been on notice of the confidential nature of such software.
It is, however, interesting to speculate on the outcome of this issue in circumstances such as the following:
(i) Despite contractual prohibitions against unauthorized use
or disclosure of its software, an employer has a history of not enforcing its rights against former employees or other third parties who violate such prohibitions.
(ii) Software is written in such a basic language that the distinction between source and object code is meaningless and anybody receiving access to the software in machine-readable form
would effectively possess in human understandable terms the basic
logic and coherence of the software. In such a situation, an employee could plausibly argue that the employer could not, in light of
his marketing strategy, realistically expect to maintain the confidential nature of the software.
(iii) The employer stops actively marketing or promoting a
certain software package.
(3)

High-Level Versus Low-Level Employees

Although the confidential relationship giving rise to the duty of
non-disclosure implied in the employment relationship clearly applies to high level employees where the need for trust and a fiduciary relationship between employer and employee is critical to the
performance of the employee's duty, at least one case suggests that
a low paid hourly employee might not enjoy a confidential relationship with his employer.65 It would not be surprising to find a part
time programmer working on an hourly basis for a particular employer defending a trade secret action brought by the employer on
the grounds that, in the absence of an express covenant, the context
of his employment did not involve a confidential relationship sufficient to support an implied covenant of non-disclosure. Given the
general sensitivity of the software industry to confidentiality and assuming that the employer utilizes some protective measures indicating the confidential nature of the software, this argument should
rarely be persuasive in software related cases.

C. THE EMPLOYEE AS DEVELOPER RATHER THAN DIsCLOSEE OF
TRADE SECRET INFORMATION
The difficult issues with respect to trade secret rights in an employer/employee relationship are further complicated when the em65. Bull v. Log Elec., Inc. 323 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Va. 1971), cited in MILGREM, SUpra
note 1, at

5.0211], n.10.2.
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ployee is also the developer of the trade secrets, as opposed to
simply a disclosee of such trade secrets.
1.

General Rules as to Ownership of Employee-Developed
Trade Secrets

A significant body of law has developed regarding the respective
rights of an employer and employee to patentable inventions developed by the employee, in the absence of an express written agreement to the contrary.
(i) The general rule is that the proprietary rights to inventions
produced by an employee pursuant to employment in which he is
66
told to make such an invention belong to the employer.
(ii) Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, it is the
general rule that the proprietary rights to inventions made by an
without any more
employee who is simply hired to make inventions
67
specific direction also belong to the employer.
(iii) At least in superficial contradiction to the foregoing principles, it is also generally accepted that proprietary rights to inventions made by employees using their employer's materials, facilities
or personnel during the course of employment remain the employee's property unless by the terms of his employment or other68
wise the employee agreed that such rights belong to his employer.
This principle is reconciled with those set forth above in that, in the
absence of express agreement, courts will look to the nature and
scope of the employment relationship to determine whether there is
an implied agreement by the employees to assign over the proprietary rights by the employees to assign over the rights in their invenfound in the
tions. Such an implied agreement is readily
69
circumstances described in (i) and (ii) above.
(iv) Where an employee develops an invention outside the
course of his employment or without any implied or express agreement to assign, but uses the employer's facilities, personnel or
materials to create the invention, the "shop rights" doctrine may
provide the employer with a non-exclusive right to use the
70
invention.
Although there is little case law on the subject, it would appear
that the reasoning underlying the above principles with respect to
patentable inventions should be applicable to trade secrets.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See MnGRmI, supra note 1, at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

5.02[4].
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2. Special Problem of Software Developer/Employee
In the absence of an express written agreement to assign, trade
secret litigation against an employee who develops software in the
course of his employment has produced judicial decisions which appear inconsistent with the principles set forth in the immediately
preceding section.
Unlike hardware, which is often designed by a large number of
employees, software is often developed by a few, or perhaps only
one person. Courts have sometimes held that the programmer has
as much right to the trade secrets inherent in a program as does his
employer.
In Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp. ,71 plaintiff corporation sued three former employees for, inter alia, misappropriation of trade secrets in a program for
solving structural analysis problems. One of the employees had
suggested that the corporation develop such a program at a time
when no other employee in the corporation had any significant
knowledge of the mathematical theories necessary to such development. That employee and the other two employees named as defendants in the action subsequently developed the program without
other assistance from plaintiff.
The trial court cited societal concerns in preserving the job mobility of technically skilled employees who might be "less attractive
to new employers so far as their acquired skills and knowledge are
regarded as trade secrets, '7 2 and then held that the employees here
did not obtain trade secrets through ."improper" means, since in
substantial measure they were the "developers and innovators" of
the trade secret program:
[I]f the subject matter of the trade secret is brought into being
because of the initiative of the employee in its creation, innovation
or development even though the relationship is one of confidence,
no duty arises since the employee may then have an interest in the
subject matter at least equal to that of his employer or in any event,
such knowledge is a part of the employee's skill and experience. In
such a case, absent an express contractual obligation by the employee not to use or disclose such confidential information acquired
during his employment adverse to his employer's interest, he is free
in subsequent employment activity . ..
to use or disclose itWhere the employer assigns the employee to a specific development task and commits considerable resources and supervision to
the project, a confidential relationship arises that prevents the employee from using or disclosing the fruits of his research. When, on
71. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
72. Id. at 1111.
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the other hand, the developments are the product of the application
of the employee's own skill, "without any appreciable assistance by
way of information or great expense or supervision by [the employer], outside of the normal expenses of his job," he has "an unqualified privilege"
to use and disclose the trade secrets so
73
developed.
The court did, however, find that the employees were nonetheless liable for breach of specific contractual provisions preventing
them from disclosing the trade secrets, thereby underscoring the potential advantages (more fully discussed below) of suing for the
breach of an express non-disclosure covenant rather than relying on
a breach of the covenant of non-disclosure implied in the employer/employee relationship.
The decision in Structural Dynamics seems inconsistent with
the rules applied in patent cases insofar as the defendant employees
were clearly developing the software in the course of their employment with plaintiff while drawing a salary for work on that specific
development project. Despite these facts, the court supported the
proposition that, absent an express contractual provision to the contrary, the developer employees could not be enjoined from using the
fruits of their effort. The conceptual underpinning for the distinction made by the court in StructuralDynamics between the scope of
implied covenants with respect to an employee who develops rather
than simply receives access to his employer's trade secrets was
comprehensively articulated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Wexler v. Greenberg,74 quoted with approval in a leading California trade secret case as follows:
We are initially concerned with the fact that the final formulations claimed to be trade secrets were not disclosed to Greenberg
by the appellees during his service or because of his position.
Rather, the fact is that these formulas had been developed by
Greenberg himself, while in the pursuit of his duties as Buckingham's (i.e., plaintiffs) chief chemist, or under Greenberg's direct
supervision. We are thus faced with the problem of determining
the extent to which a former employer, without the aid of any express covenant, can restrict his ex-employee, a highly skilled chemist, in the uses to which this employee can put his knowledge of
formulas and methods he himself developed during the course of
his former employment because this employer claims these same
formulas, as against the rest of the world, as his trade secrets. This
problem becomes particularly significant when one recognizes that
Greenberg's situation is not uncommon. In this era of electronic,
chemical, missile and atomic development, many skilled techni73. Id. at 1111-12 (citations omitted).
74. 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
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cians and expert employees are currently in the process of developing potential trade secrets. Competition for personnel of this
caliber is exceptionally keen, and the interchange of employment is
commonplace. One has but to reach for his daily newspaper to appreciate the current market for such skilled employees. We must
therefore be particularly mindful of any effect our decision in this
case might have in disrupting this pattern of employee mobility,
both in view of possible restraints upon an individual in the pursuit
of his livelihood and the harm to the public in general in forestalling to any extent widespread technological advances....
The sole issue for us to decide, therefore, is whether or not a
confidential relationship existed between Greenberg and Buckingham binding Greenberg to a duty of nondisclosure.
The usual situation involving misappropriation of trade secrets
in violation of a confidential relationship is one in which an employer discloses to his employee a pre-existing trade secret (one already developed or formulated) so that the employee may duly
perform his work. In such a case the trust and confidence upon
which legal relief is predicated stems from the instance of the employer's turning over to the employee the pre-existing trade secret.
It is then that a pledge of secrecy is impliedly extracted from the
employee, a pledge which he carries with him even beyond the ties
of his employment relationship. Since it is conceptually impossible,
however, to elicit an implied pledge of secrecy from the sole act of
an employee turning over to his employer a trade secret which he,
the employee, has developed, as occurred in the present case, the
appellees must show a different manner in which the present circumstances support the permanent cloak of confidence cast upon
75
Greenberg by the Chancellor.
In Wexler, the court concluded that the defendant employee
Greenberg was entitled to disclose and use the formulas which he
had developed in the course of his employment since they were a
part of the technical knowledge and skill which he had acquired by
virtue of his employment-even though the formulas were acknowledged by the court to constitute trade secrets of plaintiff.
While the decision in Wexler has been criticized in view of the
specific facts before the court, 76 there may in fact be merit to the
court's recognition that the employee/developer of a trade secret
has a more compelling basis on which to continue use of a trade secret after termination of his employment than does a disc-.
75. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 284-86, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198,
208-09 (1962) (citations omitted).
For cases prohibiting disclosure or use by employees of alleged trade secret information developed at least in part through their efforts, see Extrin Foods, Inc. v.
Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v.
Mica Condenser Co., Ltd., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (Mass. 1921).
76. See Note, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1473 (1961); M GRim, supra note 1, at $ 5.02[31.
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losee/employee. The distinction between the general knowledge or
skills of a particular profession and specific information relating to a
single employer is often very difficult to draw. It is certainly arguable that, as the court in Wexler indicates, such a distinction is even
more difficult to make when it is the expertise of the developer
which produces the trade secret. Moreover, since the developer/employee's livelihood consists of utilizing such expertise on a
continuing basis, the policy against restrictions preventing employee mobility should be to require a particularly rigorous scrutiny
of information alleged to be trade secrets to determine whether or
not the classification of such information as a trade secret unduly
hampers the developer/employee's mobility.
By way of example, a programmer skilled in developing medical
claims processing software who is hired by an employer to develop
such a software system will be particularly vulnerable to such employer later claiming trade secrets in the program developed for him
since it is inevitable that such employee will not be able to find subsequent employment in the medical claims software area not requiring him to utilize certain skills which reside in the gray area of
specific versus general knowledge. The plight of such a programmer
should be contrasted with that of a salesman hired by the same employer to market the system. Clearly, such a salesman can be held
to a stricter standard of non-disclosure since his subsequent employment will not require him to utilize the specifics of his former
employer's system, but only to market what his subsequent employer had developed independent of him.
D.

EXPRESS COVENANTS OF NON-DIsCLOSURE
AND NON-COMPETITION

The principal limitations circumscribing the scope of implied
covenants of trade secret non-disclosure in the employer/employee
relationship have been described above as (i) the difficulty of esta-blishing the existence of a trade secret rather than general information, (ii) notice to the employee of what information cannot be
disclosed, (iii) the possible lack of a confidential relationship giving
rise to an implied covenant of non-disclosure between the employer
and low-level employees, and (iv) the possibility of developer/employees claiming proprietary rights in the items they develop. Through use of express covenants executed by the employee,
each of these limitations can be materially limited in potential

impact.
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Covenants Not to Compete Offering Broader Protection than
Covenants Not to Disclose

In most jurisdictions, employee covenants not to compete have
been upheld when they are not broader than necessary to protect
the employer's legitimate business interests. Generally, covenants
not to compete have been enforceable in a trade secret context
when the intent of the covenant is to prevent the employee from
working in areas (i) where it would be difficult to determine if he
was using specific trade secret information of his former employer
or general information related to his profession, or (ii) where it
would be difficult for him to avoid using his former employer's trade
secret information in the course of his employment and enforcement of a simple covenant not to disclose would therefore not be
sufficient to protect the employer's interest.
Thus, in Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis,77 plaintiff Modem Controls brought an action against its former employee, Andreadakis, to enforce a covenant not to compete which would
prevent Andreadakis from working for Modern Control's competitor,
Burroughs Corporation. In overturning the district court's finding
that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable because the device which Andreadakis worked on for Modern Controls (a flat panel
gas discharge display device used to display information from a
computer to a computer user) did not contain any trade secret, the
court of appeals held as follows:
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that confidential business information which does not rise to the level of a trade secret
can be protected by a properly drawn convenant not to compete.
(citations) To require an employer to prove the existence of trade
secrets prior to enforcement of a covenant not to compete may defeat the only purpose for which the covenant exists. An employer
need only show that an employee had access to confidential information and a court will then determine the overall reasonableness
of the covenant in light of the interest sought to be protected. Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 18-20, 160 N.W.2d
566, 570-571 (1968). Modern Controls has established by affidavit
that Andreadakis had access to confidential business information.
Andreadakis claims that he and the persons he was working
with developed no confidential business information during his employment that he did not already know. He argues that he left Modem Controls with no more information than he possessed when he
left Control Data. The affidavits submitted by Andreadakis do not
support this contention. To the contrary, the unrefuted evidence
shows that during the time of his employment, the device moved
77. 578 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1978).
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from an unmarketable state to a marketable one and that this transition was accomplished after Modern Controls invested over
or seventeen, of its
$500,000 and utilized approximately one-half,
78
employees over a sixteen-month period.
The court's opinion in this case is significant insofar as it suggests that a covenant not to compete can be utilized to prevent the
disclosure of confidential as opposed to trade secret information.
The critical conceptual distinction underlying the court's opinion is
that the covenant not to compete was not viewed by the court as
simply preventing competition by Andreadakis through use of confidential information, but as preventing competition generally as a result of Andreadakis's access to such confidential information. In
this context, the court was not concerned over whether or not such
information was generally known in the industry or would have
been acquired by Andreadakis in the course of similar employment
with an alternative employer. In view of the inevitable difficulty of
distinguishing generic from specific information in software related
trade secret actions, the potential ability to obtain broad protection
for business information through use of a covenant not to compete,
without the often insurmountable burden of providing trade secret
status for such information, represents a significant benefit to be derived through use of a written covenant not to compete to supplement covenants against non-disclosure. It is interesting to note in
this context that authority also exists for the proposition that a written covenant not to disclose may provide employers with similarly
expanded coverage with respect to information that may not rise to
the level of a trade secret, but only to the extent of preventing disin
closure of such confidential information rather than competition
79
which such disclosure might be difficult to avoid or detect.
Since covenants not to compete which are broader than necessary to protect an employer's legitimate interests will not be enforced in view of the public policy against restrictions on employee
mobility, the court in Modem Controls had to face the issue of
whether or not Modern Controls had established that enforcement
of the covenant not to compete was necessary to prevent disclosure
by Andreadakis of Modern Control's confidential or trade secret
information:
The District Court also denied relief on the ground that Modem
Controls had failed to show irreparable harm because it had not established that Andreadakis had disclosed or would disclose trade
78. Id. at 1268-69 (citations and footnotes omitted).
79. See Maloney v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936, 938 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1965, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948 (1966)); MLGRIM, supra note 1, at 3.02[1] n.12 and accompanying text.
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secrets or confidential business information gained at Modern Controls to Burroughs. Andreadakis emphasizes on appeal that Burroughs specifically instructed him not to disclose any trade secrets
and that since he has already worked for Burroughs for about a
year without disclosing any trade secrets or other confidential information, it is unlikely that he would do so in the future.
The possible disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information is certainly relevant in determining the potential harm to
any employer. However, such information may be disclosed in
more subtle ways than outright disclosure to a third party. As Professor Harlan M. Blake noted,
[e]ven in the best of good faith, a former technical or "creative" employee working for a competitor, or in business for
himself in the same or a related field, can hardly prevent
his knowledge of his former employer's confidential methods or data from showing up in his work. And utmost good
faith cannot always be expected. (citation).
It is unrealistic to expect that Andreadakis has not utilized confidential information gained at Modern Controls when working on
an identical product at Burroughs. It is equally unrealistic to expect that this confidential information will not give Burroughs a significant advantage over its significantly smaller competitor.
Burroughs has the capacity to devote a large amount of its resources to the development of a competing device that would eliminate Modern Controls' competitive advantage. Andreadakis's
knowledge would be invaluable in this respect. These factors lead
to the conclusion that Modern Controls will suffer irreparable
80
harm.
The basic point made by the court in Modern Controls is that an
employee with access to one employer's confidential and trade secret information cannot realistically be expected not to utilize or disclose such information when working for a subsequent employer in
the same capacity. Accordingly, a mere covenant not to disclose
(whether implied or express) cannot, in such circumstances, be said
to protect all of the former employer's legitimate business interests.
In the same way as the expanded subject matter coverage offered by
a covenant not to compete is particularly appropriate in a software
context where the distinction between general and specific knowledge is often very murky, the use of covenants not to compete to
avoid the question of "inevitable disclosure" and related evidentiary
80. 578 F.2d at 1269-70 (citations omitted). See Blake, Employee Agreements Not
to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 669-70 (1960). See also A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v.
Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 66 A.2d 319 (1949), cited in MILGRIM, supra
note 1, at 3.0211] n.24 ("the validity of the covenant is not predicated on methods
secret in fact and revealed to the employee in confidence but rests on the protection
afforded an employer against disclosure of business and industrial methods and
processes used, records compiled and customer contacts made in the employment").
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issues is also particularly justified. This precise point is made in a
soft ware context by the court in Electronic Data Systems Corp. v.
Powell,81 through emphasis on both the practical inability of the
employee to avoid or the former employer to detect disclosure and
the conflicting promises of loyalty the employee made to his former
and current employers:
Appellant's [EDS's] business of employing systems engineers
to write computer programs for its customers is unique and highly
specialized. Its training of Powell included specialized information
pertaining to its business as distinguished from general skills and
knowledge of the trade. Restraining him from using this information is intrinsically unenforceable so long as he is employed by a
competing employer in the health-care field. It would indeed be difficult to determine if Powell were imparting his specialized knowledge to SRI [the subsequent employer] until SRI markets a
product resembling closely EDS's system.
The evidence on the merits reveals that Powell, by participating
in the servicing of SRI medicare contracts, preparing SRI proposals
to process health care claims for potential EDS customers, including a proposal to incorporate utilization review into the system operated by SRI for Kansas City Blue Shield, and participating in the
development and marketing of an SRI computer system for
processing regular business healthcare claims, has violated his covenant not to compete with EDS. All of these activities were admitted by Powell.
It was clearly established that the methods and techniques developed by EDS have resulted from a significant investment of time
and money. Even in the best of good faith, a former technical or
"creative" employee such as Powell working for a competitor such
as SRI can hardly prevent his knowledge or his former employer's
confidential methods from showing up in his work [citation omitted]. If Powell is permitted to work for SRI in the same area as that
in which he was trained by EDS, injunctive relief limited to restraint of imparting such special knowledge as prepayment utilization review, is likely to prove insufficient. The mere rendition of
service in the same area would almost necessarily impart such
knowledge to some degree in his subsequent employment. Powell
cannot be loyal both to his promise to his former employer, EDS,
and to his new obligation to his present employer, SRI. In these circumstances, the most effective protective device is to restrain Powell from working in the same computer
field in which he was
82
associated while employed by EDS.

81. 524 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
82. Id. at 398. See also, Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Ref. Co., 116 F. 304 (7th Cir.

1902) (superintendent for manufacturer of glucose, starch, grape, sugar and similar
products enjoined from violating post-employment covenant not to compete in view
of inevitable breach of covenant not to disclose secret information); Ideal Laundry
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2. Limitations on the Use of Covenants Not to Compete
It is important to recognize that use of a covenant not to compete to supplement an express or implied covenant of non-disclosure is not by any means the solution to all of the difficulties
besetting a trade secret plaintiff in an action against his former employees. Several limitations on the use of covenants not to compete
must be considered in evaluating the effectiveness of such a
covenant.
a.

Adequacy of Consideration

As the following portion of the opinion in Modern Controls,Inc.
v. Andreadakis8 3 indicates, there is some question as to whether
covenants not to compete (and perhaps the expanded protection offered by an express covenant not to disclose) entered into after the
commencement of employment are supported by adequate
consideration:
Whether a covenant not to compete entered into after employment has commenced is supported by independent consideration is
a question that has evoked considerable disagreement in the courts.
Many courts support the position that continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 825, 835-839 (1973); Blake, Employee Agreements
Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 669 n.145 (1960). Other courts
require something in addition to the mere continuance of employment. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 825, 833-835 (1973). This "something in
addition" may be a raise, a new position or an increased employment term. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet determined
whether continued employment alone is sufficient consideration for
a covenant not to compete. We need not predict what the Minnesota Court would do, however, as the covenant not to compete was
supported by something more than the mere continuance of employment. It was supported by an obligation on the part of Modern
for two years if he could
Controls to pay Andreadakis his base 8pay
4
not find suitable work in another field.

b.

Overbreadth

In recognition of the fact that covenants not to compete are at
Co. v. Gugliemme, 107 NJ. Eq. 108, 151 A. 617 (1930) (plaintiffs former employee enjoined from continuing work with plaintiffs competitor where subsequent employer
hired employee specifically to obtain plaintiffs confidential information); National
Starch Products v. Polymer Indus., 273 A.D. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1948), rearg'd and
appeal denied, 274 A.D. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 631.
83. 578 F.2d at 1267-68.
84. See discussion supra in Section I.C for additional citations and practical suggestions for dealing with this problem.
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odds with the public policy against post-employment restrictions,
courts will generally refuse to enforce such covenants if they go beyond what is required to protect the employer's reasonable business
needs as to subject matter, geographic effect or duration. It should
also be noted that the problem of overly broad post-employment restrictions is not confined to covenants not to compete but can arise
with respect to overly broad covenants not to disclose. While certain courts may flatly refuse to enforce overly broad post-employment covenants, the better rule is that courts will judicially construe
the covenant to extend only as far as it is necessary to protect the
85
employer's reasonable business interests.
c.

Void as Against Public Policy

In certain jurisdictions such as California, any post-employment
covenant not to compete (with certain exceptions generally related
to the sale of the goodwill of a business) is void as against public
policy. 86 In such jurisdictions, a former employer must rely on the
more limited protection afforded by covenants not to disclose as the
principle means of protecting against misappropriation of trade
secrets by former employees.
d.

Narrow Substantive Scope of Injunction

While courts are frequently willing to enforce covenants not to
compete through the issuance of injunctions in situations where inevitable disclosure of trade secrets would occur, the substantive
scope of such injunctions is typically limited to the narrowest possible restraint necessary to protect the former employer's legitimate
business interest.8 7 In fact, a court is more likely to enforce a covenant not to compete if it can be structured to permit the employee
to continue working in a general field only a portion of which is foreclosed by virtue of the covenant. 88 This principle applies with equal
force to injunctions issued to enforce a simple covenant not to dis85. See generally MuGRim, supra note 1, at 2.02[2].
86. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West 1964).
87. See Electronic Data Sys. v. Powell, 524 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (employee restricted from working only in that portion of data processing industry related to health care industry).
88. See Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F.
Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (applying Michigan law) (action by manufacturer of distributor-type pump for fuel injection systems against former employee for misappropriation of trade secrets related to production of such pumps; injunction issued
permitting employee to work for competitors in all fields of application engineering
and to participate in the development of all types of fuel injection systems except distributor-type pump). But see Heyden Chem. Corp. v. Burrell & Neidig, 2 N.J. Super.
467, 64 A.2d 465 (1949).
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89
close as opposed to the more restrictive covenant not to compete.
From the foregoing analysis, it can be assumed that a court
faced with fashioning injunctive relief intended to protect an employer's trade secrets in a particular piece of software will seek to
limit the scope of such injunctions to the development of functionally similar software. Thus, a programmer who developed a medical
billing system for his former employer may be enjoined from developing another medical billing system, but not from developing a legal billing system. While such an approach may in many
circumstances be adequate to protect the former employer's interest, it is possible that the distinction between, for example, a medical billing system and a legal billing system may ignore the fact that
much of the "unique logic and coherence" in a medical billing system (e.g., the portion consisting of a sophisticated data base management system) may be extremely valuable in the design of a legal
billing system. While an injunction merely preventing disclosure of
trade secrets would, by its terms, apply to such disclosure for purposes of developing the legal system, enforcement of a covenant not
to compete should probably not extend to development of a legal
billing system unless the former employer was in fact engaged in or
likely to engage in marketing or developing such a system. In the
absence of such facts, it is difficult to see how the employee could be
viewed as "in competition" with his former employer simply by engaging in the development of a legal billing system.

3.

Use of an Express Non-Disclosure Covenant to Establish
Confidential Relationship with Low-Level Employees

As discussed above, courts may be reluctant to find a confidential relationship between an employer and low-level employees sufficient to support an implied covenant of non-disclosure. In such
circumstances, as well as in other instances where it is unclear as to
whether or not information is disclosed pursuant to a confidential
relationship (e.g., disclosure to an independent contractor), execution of an express agreement acknowledging the existence of such a
relationship and the confidential nature of the information disclosed
pursuant thereto can significantly assist an employer in establishing
a legal basis on which to ground a claim for misappropriation of
89. See By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d
147 (1958) (injunction restraining employee from acquiring or using any machine similar to machines manufactured by his former employer held too broad). A good summary of the wide disparity in the scope of injunctive relief granted in trade related
cases is provided in Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 631. See also Berryhill, Trade Secret Litigatior Injunctionsand Other Equitable Remedies, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 189 (1977).
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trade secrets.9 0
4.

Use of Written Agreement to Establish Ownership of
Employee Developed Information or Knowledge

An express agreement pursuant to which an employee assigns
all right, title and interest in and to any and all inventions, discoveries and developments made in the course of his employment can
substantially reduce the risk of a court determination that a developer/employee is entitled to continuing use of developments which
he makes in the course of his employment. 91
5.

Use of Written Agreement to Put Employee on Notice of
Trade Secret Ownership

In his widely cited treatise on trade secrets, Roger Milgrim succinctly summarizes methods of use of written agreements to give
notice to employees of trade secret claims, thereby reducing at least
one of the problems discussed above with respect to non-disclosure
covenants as follows:
A written agreement clearly and unequivocally puts an employee or an independent contractor on notice of the trade secret
owner's claims. Many large corporations, through their personnel
departments, explain to new employees the reasons for a patent assignment and secrecy agreement. The theory for doing this is apparently threefold. (1) It is felt that a fair explanation will assure
the most favorable employer/employee relations. (2) It makes the
employee 'secrecy' conscious, and hopefully will induce him to exercise prudence with reference to confidential matters. (3) It establishes a standard business procedure which, in the event of
litigation respecting alleged violation of trade secret information,
might have evidentiary value tending to prove that the employee
was on notice. In a sense, standard use of a written employment
agreement will create a rebuttable presumption that an employee
was on notice of its terms even where the employee may claim to
have forgotten signing the agreement. Care should be taken, howhe is beever, to regularly acquaint an employee with the fact that
92
ing asked to sign a restrictive covenant and its meaning.
90. See generally MILGRIM, supra note 1, at 3.20[11][6].
91. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (developer employees who would otherwise
be entitled to continue use of software programs and related information they developed, held liable for breach of express covenant prohibiting such use).
92. MILGRIM, supra note 1, at 3.02[1] [C].
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IV. ENFORCING TRADE SECRET RIGHTS-THE
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

Distinguishing between generic knowledge, which is not protectible as a trade secret, and specific knowledge comprising the
unique logic and coherence of software is very difficult. In large part
this difficulty is a result of the fact that a substantial portion of all
software developed for commercial use is functionally similar to
other software on the market and simply reflects the dedicated application of generally known programming skills over a considerable
period of time. The difficulties presented by such functional similarity are compounded by the fact that a programmer intending to conceal his acts of misappropriation can easily disguise such acts by
various means:
Most courts do not possess sufficient technical background to
determine whether striking similarities exist between seemingly
dissimilar works. Therefore, expert witnesses are generally permitted to testify concerning the degree of similarity, or lack thereof, between the programs. Even experts, however, find it extremely
difficult to determine if one computer program has been copied
from another. If the plaintiff could find one expert who was willing
to testify to striking similarities, the defendant could, no doubt, get
two to swear to the contrary. The same computer process can appear in a bewildering array of forms including the flow chart, source
program and object program. Both the source and the object programs can appear on a variety of media including magnetic tape,
cards, and disk. The source program can be written in an ever increasing number of high level languages, e.g., FORTRAN, BASIC,
ALGOL, COBOL, etc. There are even 'dialects' of the source languages which vary with the computer operation. Even two source
programs written in the same language and which do precisely the
same job can be markedly different. They can differ in all the following respects: the order and manner in which data is to be entered, the variable names, the order of instructions, the statement
numbers, the way in which the same instruction can validly be expressed, the number and formulation of comment statements, and
the format of the output. They could have different underlying algorithms (in which case copying is highly unlikely), and each could
require the use of different input or output devices. All of these differences must be explained to, considered, and weighed by a trier
of the source lanof fact who has at best a minimal understanding
93
guage and the technical terminology.
93. Gemignani, Legal Protectionfor Computer Software: The View from '79, 7
RUT. J. COMPUTER TECH. &L 269, 288-89.
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A. NARROWING THE Focus TO ONLY THE TRADE
SECRET ELEMENTS OF SOFTWARE

As discussed above, the attention of a trade secret plaintiff
should not be addressed broadly to the misappropriation of
software, but rather should be focused on the misappropriation of
the trade secret elements of such software. Such elements include:
(i) the unique logic and coherence of the software producing a certain level of "commercial feasibility," (ii) the competitive "head
start" represented by a plaintiff's investment of time and effort in order to develop or acquire the use of the software, and (iii) the development and programming of novel algorithms allowing the
application of data processing technology to new functions.
B. DISCOVERY OF THE "SMOKING GUN"
In University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstoum Corp.,94 the
factual findings upon which the court ultimately found trade secret
misappropriation by the defendants were in substantial part described as follows:
Following the incorporation of LYCSC (the newly created subsidiary of LYC) the new corporation proceeded to offer AIMES IlI
to customers. Rather than purchase unrestricted rights to the system for UCC, LYCSC elected to steal the system from Leonard's.
In December, 1969, LYCSC bribed an employee of Leonard's for
$2500 to deliver a suitcase filled with computer tapes and other
materials to an employee of LYCSC. In February, 1970, this same
Leonard's employee was paid to fly to Atlanta from Dallas with additional tapes and documents once the materials originally obtained
were found to be insufficient to run the system. With the new
materials and the help of the Leonard's employee in installing the
system in the LYCSC in-house
computer, LYCSC was able to run
95
the system in its entirety.
In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,96 one of the principal factual findings resulting in judgment against Telex for misappropriation of
IBM's trade secrets in certain software was summarized by the
court as follows:
The trial court also found that Telex had misappropriated the
source code to IBM's "FRIEND" version 2 diagnostic program utilized in the diagnosis, checkout, and debugging of various devices in
a computing system. Necessary to the use of the "FRIEND" device
was the source code. IBM considered it as confidential property
and it was secured carefully. The court found that one of the IBM
94. 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. Id at 529.
96. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
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employees hired by Telex took a copy of the source code with him
to Telex and that Telex used this misappropriated material in order
to develop a Merlin-type disk ifie system. The court further found
that when Telex sold that project to the Control Data Corporation
in May 1972,97it also sold the "FRIEND" source code to Control Data
for $500,000.

In cases such as Lykes and Telex where the plaintiff can show
that the defendant has stolen an actual source or object code, the inference is reasonably clear that the defendant has sought to utilize
the "unique logic and coherence" of plaintiff's software rather than
develop a competing software system through the protected use of
generic or generally known skills. Unfortunately for trade secret
plaintiffs, the ease of disguising software as described above makes
the discovery of actual duplication or theft of source or object code
very difficult. Moreover, it is often equally difficult to uncover the
mechanism by which the theft occurred since software stored in a
computer memory can sometimes be remotely stolen over telephone
lines. In fact, most commentators agree that a knowledgeable comsoftware in a manner
puter specialist can, in many instances, steal
98
which makes detection virtually impossible.
C. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF TIME AND EXPENSE OF
DEVELOPMENT TENDING TO ESTABLISH MISAPPROPRIATION
OF THE TRADE SECRETS

The protectible "competitive head start" element of software
provides the key to proving most alleged software-related trade secret infringement in the absence of direct evidence of misappropriation (or the "smoking gun evidence") such as described in the
preceding section. Courts have been quick to recognize that where
plaintiff spends large sums of money or a great deal of time and effort to develop a specific software package and defendant, who had
access to or participated in the development of such software, produces a functionally similar package in a fraction of the time or at a
fraction of the cost, there is a high probability that the defendant
has utilized more than generally known skills or information in the
development of the competing system. This inference is particularly
strong where a subsequent employer hires the plaintiff's employee
for the express purpose of having him develop such a system.
Thus, in Telex Corp. v. IBM,99 the court found the following evi97. Id. at 911.
98. See Gemignani, supra note 93, at 288; Roddy, The FederalComputer Systems
ProtectionAct, 7 RUT. J. COMPTER TECH. & L 343, 345 (1980).

99. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Extrin Foods v. Leighton, 115 N.Y.S.2d
429 (1952) (after leaving plaintiff laboratory's employ, two employees immediately be-
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dence particularly significant in establishing trade secret misappropriation by Telex of IBM's software:
In November 1970, Telex hired John K. Clemens, who had been
IBM's engineering program manager for the Merlin project. Clemens was fully informed of the aspects of this program, including the
development and design, manufacturing, sales and forecasts. He
was hired for the purpose of developing a Merlin-type disk storage
system for Telex. In addition to a substantial salary and stock options, Clemens was given a $500,000 bonus if he produced a Telex
Merlin-type system for delivery to a Telex customer prior to November 30, 1972. Telex also set out to hire other key personnel in
connection with IBM's Merlin project offering them high salaries,
bonuses, and stock options. Telex needed to develop this in eighteen months, a schedule which the court found would have been impossible without the thefts since it had taken IBM five years to
develop the project. Telex knowingly and intentionally used the
IBM trade secrets and hired a number of new employees in order to
bring this about. The [district] court concluded that Telex succeeded in misappropriating IBM's trade secrets and appropriating
them into the Telex 6830.100
A former employee can, of course, always argue that he was
able to develop a competing system more quickly and at less expense than its prototype by virtue of the generally known skills he
either learned or refined in the development of the prototype. While
this argument can plausibly explain certain cost and time efficiencies in the development of a subsequent version of software, it cannot, given the tedious process of software development, explain
away substantial variations in costs and time of development. In
any event, it is clearly more productive in most software related
trade secret cases to have the trier of fact focus on these elements
(which are not likely in many cases to produce conflicting expert
testimony) rather than on conflicting expert testimony over the substantive similarities of the systems.
gan producing emulsion similar in chemical and physical properties to that produced
by plaintiff); Space Aero Prod. Co., 208 A.2d 74 (Md.), motion for rearg denied, 208
A.2d 699 (Md.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965) (plaintiff's former employees started
their own corporation and within twenty-nine days of receiving corporate charter
were producing oxygen breathing hose identical to that of plaintiff, despite a long history of competitors' inability to duplicate process by which plaintiff produced the
hose); Ungar Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398 (1961), disapprovedon
other grounds, Nichols v. Hast, 62 Cal. 2d 598 (1965) (plaintiff employee developed
electric soldering tools over period of many years through substantial expenditures of
time and effort; former employees of plaintiff while working for a subsequent employer developed similar product through expenditure of nominal sums and effort);
Annot., 30 A.LR.3d 631.

100. 510 F.2d at 911 (footnote omitted).
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF ERROR DUPLICATION AND EXACT
DUPLICATION OF ARBITRARY CODE TENDING TO ESTABLISH
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRET ELEMENTS
OF SOFTWARE

Unlike many products, software that has operated without
problems for extended periods of time in a productive mode may
nonetheless contain latent programming errors which have not become manifest because the system has not been called upon to perform the exact task using the exact data required to trigger the
error. A trade secret plaintiff who can demonstrate that defendant's
software containing allegedly misappropriated trade secret information includes latent programming errors which are also included in
plaintiff's original version will have a strong case for establishing
wrongful misappropriation. The evidentiary inference which arises
in such a case is much the same as that which has arisen when students are accused of cheating on a multiple choice exam on the basis of making a statistically improbable number of identical
mistakes. In such a case, it should be clear that defendant used specific programming decisions made in the course of developing plaintilt's system rather than independently developing a comparable
system through the use of generally known skills which have merely
produced functional similarity. Similar inferences arise where specific portions of defendant's system contain a code which is identical
to that of plaintiff's system in an area where there are a wide variety
of different programming decisions or coding protocols which could
have been used to achieve substantially the same result.
In many instances, the significance of focusing on duplication of
a specific error or discrete portion of a code is that such duplication
can frequently be found in software that may in fact have been
designed by an employee through the use of his former employer's
software, but which has been disguised or revised in many respects
to avoid detection of such improper design. Thus, in Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,1
the court based a finding of trade secret misappropriation by plaintiff's former employees upon the following factual findings:
At a pretrial conference the court directed to make a copy of
the static portion of the NISA code available to plaintiff's counsel
and experts pursuant to a protective order. The code which was
furnished was dated December, 1974, and reflected many revisions
made subsequent to defendants' initial code. Defendants have represented that no prior version of the NISA code remained. Portions
of the NISA code were compared to the NIESA code as it existed in
January 1973. On the basis of this comparison, plaintiffs experts,
101. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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Dr. Anderson of the Department of Aerospace Engineering at the
University of Michigan, and Michael Coble, a computer programmer
also affiliated with the University, concluded that defendants must
have copied from the NIESA code. They made a careful analysis of
the two programs and found not only similarity in the overall structure and organization (some of which might be explainable on functional grounds) but they found identical segments of code which
were solely arbitrary and, most significantly, deviations or quasimistakes which, in their judgment, could only be explained by copying. Victor Nicholas, who completed the development of NIESASUPERB at SDRC, testified that the input data cards prepared by
Surana for NIESA were taken verbatim into NISA. Except for
cross-examination, defendants did not address these specifics relied
on by the experts, but attributed such similarities as existed to
Surana's memory. The court does not accept this explanation.
Memory alone cannot explain the specifics which according to the
experts do not make sense but are explainable only by copying.
The court finds that defendants copied from the physical NIESA
code.
E.

102

ESTABLISHING THE SUBSTANTIVE UNIQUENESS OF SOFTWARE

Not all software must rest its claim for trade secret protection
upon specific elements which give it a unique logic and coherence to
differentiate it from competing software in a market filled with functionally similar products. Software is frequently developed for use
in a special application so as to achieve a certain result which has
not theretofore been accomplished by competing software developers. In similar circumstances in other industries, the courts have
recognized that some of the skills acquired by an employee in the
course of developing or receiving access to a substantively unique
item would not have been acquired by the employee in the course of
employment with others and therefore should not be viewed as generic to or generally known in the industry entitling it to trade secret protection.
For example, in Plant Industries, Inc. v. Coleman,10 3 the court in
applying California law found that plaintiff possessed trade secrets
relating to a special method for processing citrus peels. In granting
injunctive relief against plaintiff's former employee and such employee's new employer, the court specifically noted that no one
other than plaintiff had obtained the results produced by plaintiff's
method for processing citrus peels and therefore concluded that
(i) had the defendant employee worked for another employer he
would not have acquired the knowledge he now claimed the right to
102. Id. at 1117.
103. 287 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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use, and that (ii) such knowledge constituted trade secrets of plaintiff rather than generally known skills, the preemption of which
104
would unreasonably restrict the defendant employee's mobility.
It seems clear that if the unique logic and coherence of two
functionally similar software systems provides each of those systems with sufficient uniqueness to create a presumption of competitive advantage triggering trade secret protection, any additional
uniqueness in substantive result achieved should provide a plaintiff
with an even stronger case for trade secret protection. Unlike trade
secret misappropriation claims related to software systems in areas
where a great number of functionally similar systems exist and
which may require searching for the "smoking gun," discrepancies
in the development time or cost, or duplicative errors in portions of
code, courts dealing with substantive uniqueness may be able to
find trade secret infringement based primarily on the functional
similarity of defendant's system to that of plaintiff.
F.

DETAILED COMPARISON OF CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF

PREDECESSOR AND ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING SOFTWARE

SYSTEMS
While the task of a trade secret plaintiff is certainly simplified
upon discovery of the "smoking gun" or circumstantial evidence
showing unreasonably small time and cost of development or duplication of arbitrary code or latent errors, such a discovery is not the
only means of establishing trade secret misappropriation in a
software context. The option remains for plaintiff to conduct a detailed comparison of the constituent elements of his software and
the allegedly infringing software in order to establish similarities indicating misappropriation rather than independent development.
In an unpublished work, Gerald H. Larsen, formerly president
of Unicorn Systems Company, a Los Angeles based software consulting company, has isolated the following constituent elements of
most software which may be the focus of a trade secret plaintiff in
attempting to establish the misappropriation of his software by comparison of the two systems:
104. See also Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 144 A.2d 306 (Conn. 1958) (trade secret alleged in warm-heading process used in manufacture of screws; in finding in favor of
plaintiff against its former employees, court noted that of plaintiff's many competitors, only one had developed similar process).
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External or Functional Elements
(i) Input/Output
(ii) Data Base Flow
(iii) Manner in which system accumulates history
and the scope of such generated history
(iv) Error Detection Process
(v) Particular Formulas (e.g., optimum re-order point
in an inventory control system)
(vi) The unique combination of all of the foregoing in
a particular system
Internal Elements
(i) Programming language and programming
techniques
(ii) Functional and temporal relationships between
two or more programs or transactions
(iii) Sub-program structures (i.e., breakdown of tasks
into specific components)
(iv) Optimization Techniques (e.g., use of a register
to hold portion of data base for repetitive
functions)
(v) Tasks which logically could have been included
in the system but were not
(vi) Arbitrary Limits (e.g., size of ffies)
(vii) The unique combination of all the foregoing in a
particular system
Proof of misappropriation through comparison of the above constituent elements in two software systems relies upon the fact that,
in the process of software development, the definition of a particular
task does not dictate its solution. While comparably skilled systems
analysts or programmers might independently arrive at comparable
tasks which must be performed by functionally similar software systems and might understand the need to utilize all of the above elements to provide the software with the capability to perform such
tasks, the creation of such elements can, in most circumstances, be
accomplished in a large variety of forms. The specific way in which
each of the above elements are utilized in a software system to accomplish a specific task is, of course, what gives the system its
''unique logic and coherence."
Because of the very large number of decisions which must be
made by a systems analyst or programmer in creating the constituent elements of a software system, it should be possible to establish
trade secret misappropriation in a software context by reference to
what Mr. Larsen has referred to as the "frequency of remarkable co-
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incidences." That is, the more often the constituent elements of a
software system are very similar, despite the endless variety of
forms in which such elements could have appeared, the more likely
it is that an act of misappropriation has occurred.
It is important to note in this context that the comparison of
constituent elements will not in all circumstances be possible at the
coding level. For example, the comparable use by two systems of a
memory register in the performance of a particular repetitive task
might be a "remarkable coincidence" tending to show misappropriation despite the fact that defendant has tried to disguise such misappropriation by coding such memory register in a manner dissimilar
to that existing in plaintiff's system. While it might be argued that
the use of memory registers in a design or programming technique
commonly known in the software industry, the use of such a register
in a particular context to achieve a particular result can be viewed
as a specific design or programming decision not necessarily entailed by the functional task of the system.
The result achieved through use of the memory register could
have been accomplished without such memory register by repetitive
accessing of the data base, although such an alternative solution
might require additional allocations of computer resources and
therefore would be less economical. Since the use of memory registers is, however, a commonly known design or programming technique, comparable use of such technique in two software systems
might not, in itself, establish trade secret misappropriation rather
than independent development. Accordingly, a plaintiff's chances of
proving misappropriation will improve in some direct proportion to
the number of such similarities which appear between his software
system and that of defendant.
V.

CONCLUSION

Industry observers are often quick to criticize the efficacy of
trade secret protection for software. Simply stated, these critics argue that a radically new technology such as software cannot be accommodated within a legal framework which evolved prior to the
development of the technology. This argument is premised on the
difficulty of applying standard trade secret principles to the typical
factual situation present in a case of alleged misappropriation of
software. The complexity of the generic/specific issue in the context
of employee-developed software is, of course, a good example of
such difficulty.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the contours of trade secret law have evolved in response to conflicting public policies of
major magnitude. The recent emergence of the software industry

264
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requires that a balance between such conflicting policies be struck
in a new factual environment. Courts have been able to strike such
a balance in the past by adapting traditional trade secret doctrine to
emerging technologies. Based on the decisions which have been
handed down to date, there is good reason to believe that traditional
trade secret doctrine will provide the courts with an appropriate
framework within which to grapple with the difficult and far reaching economic and social issues currently presented by the data
processing industry.

19821

TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
APPENDIX
CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE
AGREEMENTS

A.

CURRENT EMPLOYEES OR CURRENT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

The undersigned is an employee or independent contractor working
for Laser Media, Inc. ("Company"). This Agreement is intended to
formalize in writing certain understandings and procedures which
have been in effect since the time the undersigned was initially employed or engaged by Company. In consideration of the undersigned's original and continuing employment with or work for
Company in a capacity in which he or she may receive or contribute
to the production of Confidential Information (as defined below) the
undersigned hereby confirms his or her understanding and agreement as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, "Confidential Information" shall
mean information or material proprietary to Company or designated
as Confidential Information by Company and not generally known
by non-Company personnel, which the undersigned develops or of
which the undersigned may obtain knowledge or access through or
as a result of the undersigned's relationship with Company (including information conceived, originated, discovered or developed in
whole or in part by the undersigned). The Confidential Information
includes, but is not limited to, the following types of information and
other information of a similar nature (whether or not reduced to
writing): discoveries, ideas, concepts, software in various stages of
development, designs, drawings, specifications, techniques, models,
data, source code, object code, documentation, diagrams, flow charts,
research, development, processes, procedures, "know-how," marketing techniques and materials, marketing and development plans,
customer names and other information related to customers, price
lists, pricing policies and financial information. Confidential Information also includes any information described above which Company obtains from another party and which Company treats as
proprietary or designates as Confidential Information, whether or
not owned or developed by Company. INFORMATION PUBLICLY
KNOWN THAT IS GENERALLY EMPLOYED BY THE TRADE AT
OR AFTER THE TIME THE UNDERSIGNED FIRST LEARNS OF
SUCH INFORMATION, OR GENERIC INFORMATION OR
KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD HAVE
LEARNED IN THE COURSE OF SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT OR
WORK ELSEWHERE IN THE TRADE, SHALL NOT BE DEEMED
PART OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
2. All notes, data, reference materials, sketches, drawings, memo-
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randa, documentation and records in any way incorporating or reflecting any of the Confidential Information and all proprietary
rights therein, including copyrights, shall belong exclusively to Company and the undersigned agrees to turn over all copies of such
materials in the undersigned's control to Company upon request or
upon termination of the undersigned's employment with Company.
3. The undersigned agrees during his employment by Company
and thereafter to hold in confidence and not to directly or indirectly
reveal, report, publish, disclose or transfer any of the Confidential
Information to any person or entity, or utilize any of the Confidential Information for any purpose, except in the course of the undersigned's work for Company.
4. The undersigned agrees that any inventions, ideas or original
works of authorship in whole or in part conceived or made by the
undersigned during or after the term of his or her employment or
relationship with Company which are made through the use of any
of the Confidential Information or any of Company's equipment, facilities, supplies, trade secrets or time, or which relate to the Company's business or the Company's actual or demonstrably
anticipated research and development, or which result from any
work performed by the undersigned for Company, shall belong exclusively to Company and shall be deemed part of the Confidential
Information for purposes of this Agreement whether or not fixed in
a tangible medium of expression. Without limiting the foregoing,
the undersigned agrees that any such original works of authorship
shall be deemed to be "works made for hire" and that Company
shall be deemed the author thereof under the U.S. Copyright Act
(Title 17 of the U.S. Code), provided that in the event and to the extent such works are determined not to constitute "works made for
hire" as a matter of law, the undersigned hereby irrevocably assigns
and transfers to Company all right, title and interest in such works,
including but not limited to copyrights. This agreement shall be
construed in accordance with the provisions of Section 2870 of the
California Labor Code relating to inventions made by an employee,
and accordingly this agreement is not intended and shall not be interpreted to assign to or vest in Company any of the undersigned's
rights in any inventions other than those described in the first sentence of this Paragraph 4.
5. Because of the unique nature of the Confidential Information,
the undersigned understands and agrees that Company will suffer
irreparable harm in the event that the undersigned fails to comply
with any of his or her obligations under Sections 2, 3 or 4 above and
that monetary damages will be inadequate to compensate Company
for such breach. Accordingly, the undersigned agrees that Company
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will, in addition to any other remedies available to it at law or in equity, be entitled to injunctive relief to enforce the terms of Sections
2, 3 and 4 above.
6. This Agreement shall be governed by California law applicable
to contracts between residents of California which are wholly executed and performed in California. This Agreement contains the full
and complete understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior representations and understandings, whether oral or written. In the event that any
provision hereof or any obligation or grant of rights by the undersigned hereunder is found invalid or unenforceable pursuant to judicial decree or decision, any such provision, obligation or grant of
rights shall be deemed and construed to extend only to the maximum permitted by law, and the remainder of this Agreement shall
remain valid and enforceable according to its terms.
I agree to the above terms and acknowledge receipt of a copy of this
Agreement.
Date:

Signature:

Name (printed):

Social Security No:

Mailing Address:
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NEW EMPLOYEES OR NEW INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

The undersigned is being hired to perform services as an employee
or independent contractor working for Laser Media, Inc. ("Company"). In consideration of the undersigned's original and continuing employment with or work for Company in a capacity in which he
or she may receive access or contribute to the production of Confidential Information (as defined below), the undersigned agrees as
follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, "Confidential Information" shall
mean information or material proprietary to Company or designated
as Confidential Information by Company and not generally known
by non-Company personnel, which the undersigned develops or of
which the undersigned may obtain knowledge or access through or
as result of the undersigned's relationship with Company (including
information conceived, originated, discovered or developed in whole
or in part by the undersigned). The Confidential Information includes, but is not limited to, the following types of information and
other information of a similar nature (whether or not reduced to
writing): discoveries, ideas, concepts, software in various stages of
development, designs, drawings, specifications, techniques, models,
data, source code, object code, documentation, diagrams, flow charts,
research, development, processes, procedures, "know-how," marketing techniques and materials, marketing and development plans,
customer names and other information related to customers, price
lists, pricing policies and financial information. Confidential Information also includes any information described above which Company obtains from another party and which Company treats as
proprietary or designates as Confidential Information, whether or
not owned or developed by Company. INFORMATION PUBLICLY
KNOWN THAT IS GENERALLY EMPLOYED BY THE TRADE AT
OR AFTER THE TIME THE UNDERSIGNED FIRST LEARNS OF
SUCH INFORMATION, OR GENERIC INFORMATION OR
KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD HAVE
LEARNED IN THE COURSE OF SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT OR
WORK ELSEWHERE IN THE TRADE, SHALL NOT BE DEEMED
PART OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
2. All notes, data, reference, materials, sketches, drawings, memoranda, documentation and records in any way incorporating or reflecting any of the Confidential Information and all proprietary
rights therein, including copyrights, shall belong exclusively to Company and the undersigned agrees to turn over all copies of such
materials in the undersigned's control to Company upon request or
upon termination of the undersigned's employment with Company.
3. The undersigned agrees during his employment by Company
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and thereafter to hold in confidence and not to directly or indirectly
reveal, report, publish, disclose or transfer any of the Confidential
Information to any person or entity, or utilize any of the Confidential Information for any purpose, except in the course of the undersigned's work for Company.
4. The undersigned agrees that any inventions, ideas or original
works of authorship in whole or in part conceived or made by the
undersigned during or after the term of his or her employment or
relationship with Company which are made through the use of any
of the Confidential Information or any of Company's equipment, facilities, supplies, trade secrets or time, or which relate to the Company's business or the Company's actual or demonstrably
anticipated research and development, or which result from any
work performed by the undersigned for Company, shall belong exclusively to Company and shall be deemed part of the Confidential
Information for purposes of this Agreement whether or not fixed in
a tangible medium of expression. Without limiting the foregoing,
the undersigned agrees that any such original works of authorship
shall be deemed to be "works made for hire" and that Company
shall be deemed the author thereof under the U.S. Copyright Act
(Title 17 of the U.S. Code), provided that in the event and to the extent such works are determined not to constitute "works made for
hire" as a matter of law, the undersigned hereby irrevocably assigns
and transfers to Company all right, title and interest in such works,
including but not limited to copyrights. This agreement shall be
construed in accordance with the provisions of Section 2870 of the
California Labor Code relating to inventions made by an employee,
and accordingly this agreement is not intended and shall not be interpreted to assign to or vest in Company any of the undersigned's
rights in any inventions other than those described in the first sentence of this Paragraph 4.
5. Because of the unique nature of the Confidential Information,
the undersigned understands and agrees that Company will suffer
irreparable harm in the event that the undersigned fails to comply
with any of his or her obligations under Sections 2, 3 or 4 above and
that monetary damages will be inadequate to compenstate Company for such breach. Accordingly, the undersigned agrees that
Company will, in addition to any other remedies available to it at
law or in equity, be entitled to injunctive relief to enforce the terms
of Sections 2, 3 and 4 above.
6. This Agreement shall be governed by California law applicable
to contracts between residents of California which are wholly executed and performed in California. This Agreement contains the full
and complete understanding of the parties with respect to the sub-
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ject matter hereof and supersedes all prior representations and understandings, whether oral or written. In the event that any
provision hereof or any obligation or grant of rights by the undersigned hereunder is found invalid or unenforceable pursuant to judicial decree or decision, any such provision, obligation or grant of
rights shall be deemed and construed to extend only to the maximum permitted by law, and the remainder of this Agreement shall
remain valid and enforceable according to its terms.
I agree to the above terms and acknowledge receipt of a copy of this
Agreement.
Date:

Signature:

Name (printed):

Social Security No:

Mailing Address:
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VIsrrORS

It is contemplated that the undersigned may from time to time be
admitted to the premises of Laser Media, Inc. ("Co."). In consideration of the undersigned's access to the premises of Company in a capacity in which he or she may receive or obtain knowledge of
Confidential Information (as defined below), the undersigned,
hereby confirms his or her understanding and agreement as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, "Confidential Information" shall
mean information or material proprietary to Company or designated
as Confidential Information by Company and not generally known
by non-Company personnel, of or to which the undersigned may obtain knowledge or access through or as a result of the undersigned's
relationship with Company or access to Company's premises. The
Confidential Information includes, but is not limited to, the following types of information and other information of a similar nature
(whether or not reduced to writing): discoveries, ideas, concepts,
software in various stages of development, designs, drawings, specifications, techniques, models, data, source code, object code, documentation, diagrams, flow charts, research, development, processes,
procedures, "know-how," marketing techniques and materials, marketing and development plans, customer names and other information related to customers, price lists, pricing policies and financial
information. Confidential Information also includes any information
described above which Company obtains or has obtained from another party and which Company treats as proprietary or designates
as Confidential Information, whether or not owned or developed by
Company.
2. The undersigned agrees not to remove from Company's premises or to reproduce any notes, data, reference materials, sketches,
drawings, memoranda, documentation or records.
3. The undersigned agrees to hold in confidence and not to directly
or indirectly reveal, report, public, disclose or transfer any of the
Confidential Information to any person or entity, or utilize any of
the Confidential Information for any purpose at any time.
4. Because of the unique nature of the Confidential Information,
the undersigned understands and agrees that Company will suffer
irreparable harm in the event that the undersigned fails to comply
with any of his or her obligations under Sections 2 or 3 above and
that monetary damages will be inadequate to compensate Company
for such breach. Accordingly, the undersigned agrees that Company
will, in addition to any other remedies available to it at law or in equity, be entitled to injunctive relief to enforce the terms of Sections
2 and 3.
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5. This Agreement shall be governed by California law applicable
to contracts between residents of California wholly executed and
performed in California. This Agreement contains the full and complete understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter
hereof and supersedes all prior representations and understandings,
whether oral or written.
I agree to the above terms and acknowledge receipt of a copy of this
Agreement.
Date:

Signature:

Name (printed):

Social Security No:

Mailing Address:

_

